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Abstract 
In the period from 1947 to 1953, United States policy towards Israel related to the Palestinian 
property rights was not supportive nor significantly critical. The Israeli government 
dispossessed the Palestinians and took over their land while the US sought stability in the 
region and only vaguely protested the expropriation. 
 
President Harry S. Truman and his Israel-friendly advisers in the White House retracted from 
any politics that required the US to sanction Israel. Because it lacked support from the White 
House, the US State Department had to retreat from plans that forced Israel to repatriate the 
Palestinians and return their properties. 
 
The United States policy turned from favoring repatriation of the Palestinians to admitting to 
the solution of resettlement and compensation. Thereafter it left the problem to the United 
Nation, instead contributing aid money to the refugees.  
 
This thesis examines the path US policy on Palestinian property rights took during these six 
years and the reasons for the outcome. 
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1 Introduction 
There is a myth about King Gordius of Phrygia who tied an intricate knot that no one was able 
to untie until Alexander the Great, also unable to untie the knot, cut it open with his sword.1 
President Harry S. Truman cut the Gordian knot when he in 1947 approved the Partition Plan, 
thinking it would solve the problem with the European Jews, who had survived Holocaust, 
and the Palestinian conflict.2 This made the local conflict between the Palestinians and the 
Jews an international issue. “America’s position on partition represents the earliest and most 
complete formulation of official U.S. policy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”3 United 
States’ support of a new nation in a foreign land far away from Washington must have been 
for a reason. What kind of reasons would the US government have even to consider putting its 
hand in a wasp nest like the conflict in Palestine? What was US policy towards Israel 
concerning Palestinian property rights?4  
 
US policy towards the Palestinian refugees “began as an endorsement of the right of displaced 
Palestinians to return to their homes or to receive compensation or resettlement.”5 It turned 
out differently. The policy distracted from its original objective to safeguard the refugees’ 
right to return or receive compensation. Why? What happened in the period from 1947 to 
1953 that made the Truman administration give up its original policy supporting the 
Palestinians’ right to return? 
 
The UN General Assembly appointed an eleven-nation Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP) on May 13, 1947. The committee had the mandate to find a solution to the 
                                                 
1 Gordian knot: used as a metaphor for an intractable problem, (disentangling an “impossible” knot) solved 
easily by cheating or “thinking outside the box”.  http://www.crystalinks.com/gordianknot.html access date:  
October 2, 2014 
2 Donald Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945, (Washington D.C: Institute 
for Palestine Studies, 1995), 2 
3 Ibid, 3 
4 Definition of Palestinians, Arabs, Jews and Israelis in this thesis: Before 1948 there were Jews and after there 
were Israelis. The Arabs that lived in Palestine before 1948 are called Palestinians, the refugees that fled their 
homes and properties are also called Palestinians. 
5 Donald Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945, (Washington D.C: Institute 
for Palestine Studies, 1995), 4  
2 
 
situation for the Jews in Europe, and to the escalating conflict in Palestine.6 UNSCOP’s 
majority favored the partition plan, and on November 19, 1947, it forwarded the proposal to 
an Ad-Hoc Committee that voted over this plan.7 All together 38 nations voted on partition 
and 17 abstained from voting. There were 13 nations that opposed the plan. The 25 nations 
that voted for the partition, was one vote short of the necessary two-thirds majority. The Israel 
lobby and its friends in the White House exerted massive pressure on all non-Muslim states in 
the UN to make sure the next vote in the committee would be in the favor of the partition. Ten 
days later The General Assembly approved the plan.8  
 
The Partition Resolution (UN Resolution 181, November 29, 1947) stated that “after the 
termination of the British mandate in Palestine, there should be two separated and 
independent Arab and Jewish states and an international regime for the City of Jerusalem.”9 
Up to the time of the Partition Plan, Palestine had existed as a community supported by 
international law as set out in the Mandate. This law obligated the mandated power to work 
for self-existence and self-determination for the peoples living in Palestine.10 Instead of 
recognizing the Palestinians as a majority in Palestine, the international society recognized the 
Palestinians as non-Jewish communities using the Zionists’ argument that Palestine was “a 
land without people, whose civil and political rights may not prejudice the establishment of 
the Jewish national home.”11 
 
The newly founded United Nations was eager to demonstrate to the world that they could 
solve international conflicts and save the world from wars like the recent World War II. The 
                                                 
6 Kathleen Christison. Perceptions of Palestine: Their influence on U.S. Middle East policy. (California: 
University of California Press, 2001), 77 
7 A/364, 3 September 1947, Official records of the second session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 11, 
United Nation Special Committee On Palestine, report to the General Assembly, 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/07175de9fa2de563852568d3006e10
f3?OpenDocument, access date July 15, 2014  
8 Hilde Henriksen Waage, Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten, 1 (Kristiansand: Cappelen Damm 
Akademisk, 2013), 105 
9 Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine: (Oxford: Oneworld Publication Limited, 2006), 31, 
http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253 
10 Sandford R. Silverburg, Palestine and International Law: Essays on Politics and Economics, (North Carolina: 
McFarland and Company. Inc. Publisher, 2002), 1 
11 Ibid, 253 
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League of Nations, the UN’s predecessor, left the antagonistic situation in Palestine to 
become the United Nations decisive test case. The clashes between the British and the Jews in 
Palestine became more frequent and more violent, and the unrest in Palestine increased in a 
great part due to the large Jewish immigration.12 
 
The proclamation of the new Jewish state of Israel on May 14, 1948, changed all prospects for 
the Middle East. At that time, the internal fighting between the Jews and the Palestinians had 
gone on for a quite some time in the form of a civil war. The Palestinians, who could leave, 
left the country. In particular, a number of Palestinians from Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, and the 
villages around Jerusalem left at an early stage.13  They had the means to leave, but their aim 
was to come back when the hostility had calmed down. They did not know that most of them 
would never see their homes again. In addition to the exodus of the upper and middle classes, 
the British, who had held the mandate for Palestine since 1920, had announced to the United 
Nations General Assembly that they would terminate the mandate and withdraw on May 15, 
1948.14 
 
The same day the surrounding Arab states attacked Israel, and one month later, the Israeli 
government closed the borders and decided that no refugee should return before the war was 
over.15 A consequence of the Arab-Israel war was that three-quarters of a million Palestinians 
became refugees. At the same time, Jews from Europe and the Middle East immigrated to or 
sought refuge in Israel. With this influx, Israel secured a demographic majority of Jews in the 
country. Between 1948 and 1953 alone, 350 of the 370 new Jewish settlements were created 
on lands confiscated under the Absentees’ Property Law of 1950. The abandoned land of the 
dispossessed refugees was transformed into Israeli state land, and the Palestinians lost 
everything.16  
                                                 
12 Henriksen Waage, Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten, 96 
13 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 30 
14 Henriksen Waage, Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten, 97 
15 Ibid, 137  
16 Michael Lynk, The Right to Restitution and Compensation in International Law and Displaced Palestinians 
http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/refuge/article/viewFile/21294/19965  
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The process of dispossession was a clear violation of UN resolutions based on international 
law protecting property rights. Such laws include the Haag Convention IV, 1907 “respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land”.17 Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, 1949 states 
that “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from 
occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power or to that of any other country, 
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive”.18 UN Resolution 194, December 
11, 1948, was the result of UN Mediator Folke Bernadotte’s proposal. Bernadotte, who was 
assassinated on September 17, 1948, by Israeli terrorists, stated “the refugees who wanted to 
return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be allowed to do so as 
soon as possible. The resolution also stated that Israel had to pay a certain compensation for 
those refugees who decided not to return”.19 
 
The resolutions mention above did not deter the expropriations of the Palestinian properties. 
The UN established a commission, the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), mandated 
to find a solution to the outstanding questions and help the refugees who wanted to return to 
their homes in Palestine.20 In an attempt to conciliate the belligerents, the PCC held a peace 
conference in Lausanne, Switzerland from April to September 1949. It was a total failure. The 
PCC then recognized that the only solution to the refugee problem was a strong and direct 
pressure on Israel from the United States.21  
 
The Palestinian problem posed moral, political and strategic dilemmas for Harry S. Truman, 
US President from 1945 to 1953. Morally, Truman believed in the biblical version of the 
Jews’ inherent right to return to Palestine, but the political and strategic issues were not that 
straightforward.22 By backing the Partition resolution US may had to send troops to Palestine 
                                                 
17 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 19 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl/intro/195?OpenDocument access date: November 7, 2012 
18 Ibid 
19 Henriksen Waage, Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten, 143 
20 Ibid, 143 
21 Ibid, 147  
22 McCullough, David, Truman, (New York: Simon&Schuster, 1992), 58 
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and that would also be the case for the USSR. Truman could give the US’s new Cold-War 
rival, the Soviet Union, an entrée to the Middle East. This again could put at risk US 
commercial interests and access to Arab oil. By not supporting the UN resolution, the US 
would undermine UN influence in a critical early stage of its existence.23 By favoring a 
Jewish statehood, Truman could provoke an Arab military action. By not supporting the 
Zionists and the Israel lobby in the United States, who had a great saying in the1948 
presidential election, he could endanger his own political future.24 
 
Israel had to consider restitution or compensation for the Palestinian refugees, knowing that 
this would be linked to the question of repatriation or resettlement. The Absentee Property 
Law would legalize the Israeli government’s expropriation of the Palestinians’ land. By 
hindering the Palestinians in returning to their land, physically and by use of newly 
established laws, Israel was able to confiscate their properties. In order to obtain a genuine 
Jewish state, resettlement of the refugees in the Arab neighboring states was the only solution 
for the Israeli government. The Americans protested vaguely. In order to honor UN 
Resolution 194, compensation ought to be paid for the land that had belonged to the 
refugees.25  
 
1.1 Theoretical perspectives: The United States decision-making process on 
foreign policy between 1947 and 1953 
President Truman and his beliefs and decisions were central to the political arena described in 
this thesis. Truman used his powers to overrule the US State Department, which in turn was 
frustrated because of Truman’s unwillingness to listen to advices on foreign policy.26 The 
Israel lobby in the United States had significant influence and was heavily involved in US 
policymaking toward Israel and the 1948 presidential election. Also a majority of the 
American population supported the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Palestinian 
                                                 
23 Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, 31 
24 Ibid, 31 
25 Michael R. Fischbach, Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 363  
26 Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945, 28 
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refugees became a political tool for the belligerents in the Arab-Israel conflict and Truman 
had to deal with it. 
After World War II, the United States emerged as a superpower, turning from isolationism to 
political involvement in international politics. The task to lead these profound political 
changes fell on President Truman. He was to “adjust to events at home and abroad, which 
dramatically changed the nature of American government, society and diplomacy.”27 Truman 
was a president with ambitions. He took office when Franklin D. Roosevelt died on April 12, 
1945 and later ran for office, winning the presidential election in 1948.28  
 
United States foreign policy took a sharp turn. The beginning of the Cold War made it quite 
clear that the world had changed. The looming communism created an anti-Soviet consensus 
in United States. The “technology had made the world a smaller place; geography was no 
longer adequate defense. In sum, these attitudes constituted a dramatic redefinition of 
America security.”29 In the eyes of the US, this included the entire Western world, and Israel 
became an American outpost in the Middle East. 
 
The tug of war between the White House and the State Department started as soon as Truman 
took office. The President had from the start an issue with the “Striped Pants Boys” as he 
called the career bureaucrats in the State Department.30 Even Secretary of State from 1947 to 
1949, George Marshall who was a man Truman truly admired, had conflicts with Truman.31  
 
The Israel lobby in United States had always been strong, and now it tried to influence 
Truman to recognize and commit to give his support for a genuine Jewish state in Palestine. 
                                                 
27Mark. S Byrnes, The Truman Years, (London: Person Education Limited, 2000), 4 
28 Byrnes, The Truman Years, 60 
29 Ibid, 14 
30 Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945, 28 
31 Ibid, 64 
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The State Department saw the danger in the lobby influencing Truman to pursue a policy in 
the Middle East that would “divert U.S foreign policy from what it should actually pursue.”32  
 
A good example on how the line of power worked was a meeting that took place on May 12, 
1948 in the White House. The President wanted to consult with the State Department and his 
personal advisers about the recognition of the new Jewish state. Present at the meeting was 
Marshall and Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett. Representing the White House was 
David K. Niles, administrative assistant, who was the “behind-the-scene liaison between the 
White House and Zionists.”33 Presidential counselor Clark Clifford also attended the meeting. 
He was “close to the Zionist community, and his advise to Truman on Palestine usually 
reflected its view and opposed those of the State Department.”34 These men did not agree. 
Clifford spoke for the Zionist cause and said that it was necessary for the US to recognize the 
Jewish State before the Soviet Union did. The State Department accused Clifford of making 
an obvious attempt to win the Jewish votes in the 1948 presidential election and pointed out 
that the issue was not about domestic, but international policy. Marshall went as far as telling 
Truman that he would not vote for the President if he took Clifford’s advice. President 
Truman “terminated the interview by saying that he was fully aware of the difficulties and 
dangers in the situation to say nothing of the political risks involved which he, himself, would 
run.”35 Clifford’s initial wish was to have the President make an early announcement 
recognizing Israel even before the Jews proclaimed the new state, but Truman abstained from 
this.36  
 
The example illustrates that the White House advisers, who spoke the Zionist language and 
supported their cause, influenced Truman, but that he made his own decisions based on what 
he believed was right. Truman truly believed that he did what was in the best interest of the 
                                                 
32 Review by Andrew Preston, John. J Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Power of Ethnic Groups in the 
Making of American Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007) (Harvard) http://h-
diplo.org/roundtables/PDF/IsraelLobby-Roundtable.pdf access date: September 23, 2014 
33 Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945, 29 
34 Ibid, 29 
35 Memorandum of Conversation, by Secretary of State, Washington, May 12, 1948, Foreign Relations of the 
United States hereafter (FRUS) 1948, 972-976 
36 Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945, 64 
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United States.37 Affected by public opinion and eager to show his potential as President, he 
was not going to let the State Department dominated him.38 He more than once diverted from 
political strategies or withdrew from plans. This had negative consequences for US foreign 
relations and policies. Washington had its own agenda, and Truman had a shifting mind and it 
was not easy for State Department to exert its foreign policy.39  
 
1.2 The US and the Middle East in the literature 
Students of Middle East history often find that there are conflicting historical narratives from 
different perspectives on this topic. When covering the United States and the Middle East in 
the period from 1947 to 1953, there is a large set of articles and other literature from which to 
choose. The Middle East conflict engages and provokes, and historians as well as 
policymakers from all over the world have produced detailed research and documentation.  
 
The larger part of the literature for my thesis concerns the Israeli-American relationship but 
also includes literature concerning the detailed handling of the Palestinian refugee question. 
In Benny Morris’, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, (1987), The Birth of the 
Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited 2, (2004) and 1948 and After: Israel and the 
Palestinians (1990) Morris describes in detail the dispossession of the Palestinians. Also 
Michael R. Fischbach, Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, (2003) goes more into specific detail than others.40 Fishbach focuses on 
compensation for the refugees and the efforts made by UN subcommittees and the US. Peter 
Grose, Israel in the mind of America (1984), Donald Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards 
Palestine and Israel since 1945 (2002) and Peter L. Hahn, Caught in The Middle East: U.S. 
Policy toward the Arab- Israel Conflict, 1945-1961 (2004) all describe the US’ relationship 
                                                 
37 Byrnes, The Truman Years, 59 
38 Fischbach, Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 220  
39 Peter Grose, Israel In the Mind of America, (New York: Schocken Books, 1984), 185 
40 Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem and Benny Morris, 1948 And Israel And The 
Palestinians, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) and Fischbach, Records of Dispossession: Palestinian 
Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict  
  
9 
 
with Israel and American involvement in the Arab-Israel conflict.41 Hilde Henriksen Waage, 
Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten (2013) is a comprehensive study on how the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the superpowers’ involvement in it affected the entire Middle 
East region.42  
 
The biography of President Harry S. Truman has been intriguing to read. He was president in 
America in a turbulent time. The geostrategic was changing and the United States was 
involved in almost all its aspects. David McCullough, Truman (1992) gives a complete story 
of the 33rd President and an insight into Truman’s decision-making processes on the Middle 
East and how he was pulled in different directions by influential lobbyists, the State 
Department and his own beliefs.43  Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, The Cold War and the 
Middle East, (1997) has addressed the impact of the Cold War in the Middle East on three 
levels: regional, domestic and international.44 United States’ policy toward Israel was 
influenced by the Cold War and the rivalry of allies in the Middle East.  
 
This study is an empirical research based on primary and secondary sources. The chapters are 
thematically divided, each focusing on different relevant aspects of my thesis. Each chapter is 
again structured chronologically from 1947 to 1953 except for chapter four, which is divided 
thematically using examples to emphasis problems. 
 
1.3 Primary Sources 
I have collected primary sources from two different places: One is the Nobel Institute in Oslo, 
where I studied the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) documents. It is the official 
historical documents on major foreign policy and diplomatic events. These documents are 
also available online. The other is the Israel State Archives (ISA), which in the 1980ies made 
                                                 
41 Grose, Israel In the Mind of America, Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 
1945, Peter L. Hahn, Caught In The Middle East, U.S. Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004) 
42 Henriksen Waage, Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten 
43 David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 99 
44 Yezid Sayigh, Avi Shlaim, The Cold War and the Middle East, 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 5 
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its documents available to the public. My search in the Documents on the Foreign Policy of 
Israel, which is a collection of state records and diplomatic documents starting just before the 
establishment of Israel, have been on Israeli correspondence with the US State Department 
and the UN between 1947 and 1953.  
 
The FRUS documents that I have looked into cover the period from 1947 to 1953 and are 
mostly memorandums of conversations or written letters. The documents describe the US 
State Department’s involvement in the refugee problem, Israel’s establishment, and the 
United Nations’ attempts to resolve the compensation question. The documents also reveal 
the US diplomacy with the Arab states.   
 
The foreign policy documents that I found in Israel consist mostly of correspondence between 
the Israel Department of Foreign Affairs, the US State Department, the Refugee Office of the 
Palestine Conciliation Commission, and other UN agencies. This correspondence shows the 
Israeli way of relating to the criticism received from the UN regarding Palestinian refugees. In 
the archives, there were also letters written to American politicians by Palestinians living in 
the USA, who requested compensation for lost properties. Documents I found revealed 
Israel’s political stands related to compensation and its own counter claim for compensation. 
Searching in my primary sources shed light on what took place in US political corridors 
concerning the Palestinian refugees’ properties and on Israel government’s political strategy 
for safeguarding the new Jewish state in Palestine.  
  
11 
 
2 US Politics Toward Israel 
The years 1947 to 1953 showed a tremendous shift in US politics. The American politicians 
had to establish new patterns concerning domestic as well as world politics. Harry S. Truman 
presided over both the creation of the postwar world and postwar America, and for the 
relatively fresh politician from Missouri this was a challenge.45 In this period, American 
politics would turn from isolationism to become a world superpower. It could not have been a 
more shifting time to be faced with the responsibility of an American presidency.  
 
After the end of World War II and Franklin D. Roosevelt`s death on April 12, 1945, Truman 
had to face the collapse of Germany and the successful testing of the atomic bomb, which 
could end the war in Asia. The use of nuclear devices in combat would also change the world 
and be of great importance to the new upcoming war: the Cold War. Middle Eastern policy 
became a legacy more complicated than he had ever thought. The President and the US State 
Department would differ in their opinions on most issues concerning the Middle East. The 
State Department saw the danger in US sponsorship of Israel; it would probably cause 
hostility from the rest of the Arab world. However, the officials in the State Department 
recognized the considerable Jewish influence on President Truman, which eventually resulted 
in a shift in US policy concerning Palestine and Israel. 
 
To understand US politics toward Israel from 1947 to 1953, four different aspects have to be 
explained. The first is the Zionists in the US and the Israel lobby. Second, it is President 
Harry S. Truman as he played a significant role for the new Israel and overruled the third 
aspect, the State Department, on the Palestine land and refugee issues. Finally, it is the Cold 
War and Israel, who would become a Cold-War ally of the USA and by that justify the 
request for not only security but also arms and economic aid.46  
                                                 
45 Byrnes, The Truman Years, 1 
46 Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945, 98 
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2.1 The Zionists in the United States  
Truman’s Biblical belief would influence his decisions concerning the new Jewish state, 
Israel. He truly believed that the Jews had a religious right to return to Palestine and establish 
a Jewish national homeland. The Israel lobbyist also influenced Truman on this matter. The 
Americans and the Jews have had a special relationship since the start of the New World. 
They had been in harmony and disharmony, emotionally and politically.  
 
An illustration of this goes all the way back to 1814, when Presbyterian Pastor John 
McDonald of Albany, NY, had a vision of a special role for America in the Jewish destiny. In 
his study of the Old Testament, he read and interpreted Isaiah´s Chapter 18.47 Isaiah presaged 
the restoration of the Jews to their own land and the ensuing redemption of all mankind. For 
McDonald the text, especially the first verse of Isaiah, which in its poetry mentions “the land 
shadowing with wings”, had a special meaning. Was it not so that the land under the 
outstretched wings of the mighty eagle was the newly adopted sign of the United States of 
America? McDonald declared in his sermons that by the end of the days, the Jews should be 
returned to the land of Zion - and that it fell to the Christian America to lead the nations to 
“send their sons and employ their substance in his heaven-planned expedition”, as Isaiah´s 
chapter 18 says. 48 McDonald’s sermon won a wide audience and Isaiah’s Chapter 18 became 
a call to faith and to action. The seed was sown, and the theological symbol became a political 
plan until the day of decision 134 years later. 
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Another American evangelist named William Eugene Blackstone continued the path to the 
preparation for the second coming of Christ by the return of the Jews to the Holy Land. In 
1878, he published the work Jesus Is Coming, which sold over a million copies, and was 
translated into 48 languages, including Hebrew.49 Blackstone was a businessman and his self-
earned wealth gave him the opportunity to throw himself into his lifelong avocation, namely 
the preparation for the second coming of Christ. Blackstone also recognized the problem with 
the social pressures of Russian Jewry crowding into the United States, so he devised his plan. 
It was called the Blackstone Memorial and was a religious Christian document, which was 
remarkable for its time in 1891, when no one had heard about political Zionism.  
 
Basically the Blackstone Memorial proposed a solution that would solve the immigration 
problem of the Russian Jews to the society of America and at the same time support a 
religious theory of the second coming of Christ, all this by just giving Palestine to the Jews. 
Blackstone justified his memorial, by asking: “Is Palestine ours to give? Well, the Treaty of 
Berlin in 1878 gave the Turkish provinces of Bulgaria to the Bulgarians and Serbia to the 
Serbians – does not Palestine as rightfully belong to the Jews?”50   Blackstone also stated, 
“[n]o expulsion of the present inhabitants of the land was contemplated.”51 He meant that the 
new Jewish state would be founded only on public lands ceded by the Turkish state, just as 
Bulgaria and Serbia had been. As he saw it, no one could accuse the United States for seeking 
imperial aggrandizement in Palestine. “Her efforts for Israel would be recognized as entirely 
unselfish and purely philanthropic.”52 
  
For Blackstone himself, it was a religious mission. In fact, Theodor Herzl, who is considered 
the founder of political Zionism, annoyed him. Herzl’s book called Der Judenstaat (1896) did 
not see the religious purpose of designating Palestine to be the chosen land for the chosen 
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people. In Herzl’s early writings, it did not matter if the Jewish state was established in 
Palestine, Uganda or Argentina.53 Blackstone handed his petition to President Benjamin 
Harrison on March 5, 1891, and the President promised to give it careful consideration. 
Nothing came out of the Blackstone Memorial. The lesson to be learned for future Zionists 
from the Blackstone Memorial was that even grand public statements needed to be 
supplemented with discreet political pressure; otherwise, they would have no or little effect. 
Even referring to Biblical evidence that the return of the Jews was meant to be, did not 
persuade President Harrison. However, the Biblical script was to influence a later president. 
Harry S. Truman was a man who had read the Bible carefully, especially the story about 
Cyrus, who permitted the return of the Jews from Babylon to build the Second 
Commonwealth in Jerusalem.54  
 
In the early part of the 20th century, the Jewish immigration to America increased because of 
the many pogroms in Eastern Europe.55 Something had to be done to the situation with the 
new Jewish immigration. In 1906, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) was established by 
high class prominent American Jews, who saw themselves first as Americans, then as Jews. 
The American Jews’ identity became an issue that would divide the American Jewry: What 
was the concept of the Jewish identity? Was Zionism a quest for a Jewish national home or a 
religious matter? The political Zionism, which called for a Jewish nationality, became a threat 
for the process of Americanization of Jewish immigrants.56 
 
The one to put American Zionism on the agenda of the public opinion was Louis Dembitz 
Brandeis. Brandeisian Zionism stood for the enrichment of Jewish life in America as well in 
Palestine. “Zionism [was] a great social experiment, representing […] in Jewish life what 
progressivism [did] in general American life.”57 As a leader for the American Provisional 
Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs in 1914, Brandeis managed to raise millions 
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of dollars to relieve Jewish suffering in war-torn Europe, and from that time on, USA became 
the financial center for world Zionism. He also proclaimed that being an appointment to the 
Supreme Court presented no conflict between Zionism and loyalty to America. Some people 
thought differently. After receiving criticism for being active in a political and social manner, 
and at the same time a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court, in 1916 Brandeis resigned his 
official position as a Zionist leader. But he was still the leader in control until 1921.58  
Brandeis did not sever his relations with Zionism. ”In fact, for the next five years he exercised 
de facto leadership in the movement, while Stephen Wise and Julian Mack occupied the formal 
positions.”59 Brandeis, having no official standing on the matter but instead discussing a human 
and philanthropic issue and since he also was a good friend of President Woodrow Wilson, his 
back-channel diplomacy was most effective. Kathleen Christison (Perceptions of Palestine) 
states: “Wilson’s friendship with Brandeis was probably what most heavily influenced him to 
give active support to [the] Zionist goal.”60 This was also the case when in November 1917 the 
Balfour Declaration, which promised British support for the establishment in Palestine of a 
Jewish national home, was issued. President Wilson gave his support. 
Balfour Declaration: Foreign Office, November 2nd, 1917: Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in 
conveying to you. On behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with 
Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. His Majesty's 
Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and 
will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities 
in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. I should be grateful if you 
would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.  
Yours,  
Arthur James Balfour.61 
The Jewish contributions to the building of a Jewish national home in Palestine were privately 
and politically inspired. From 1920 to the outbreak of World War II, more American capital 
and more American citizens were concentrated in Palestine than all other Arab Middle East 
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combined. With the crash of Wall Street in 1929, which led to an economic depression, even 
more Jews immigrated to Palestine.62  
 
After Franklin D. Roosevelt became president, American domestic policy and the 
development of the “New Deal” program became an important task for the intellectual Jews 
in America. The social idealism and the need for new economic and political forms had 
replaced some of the enthusiasm for the Zionist cause.63  The largest Jewish organization at 
this time, the American Jewish Committee, (AJC) representing 1.5 million American Jews, 
was opposing Zionism. Many of them believed that rescuing European Jews from war and 
persecution was more important than the issue of statehood in Palestine. 
 
In opposition to these moderate Zionists, a Rabbi named Abba Hillel Silver and his group won 
the support of a Zionist convention held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York in May 1942. Silver 
and David Ben-Gurion, who was the head of the Jewish Agency and the leader of the 
Palestinian’s Jewish community, presented the Biltmore program. Later Ben-Gurion was to 
become Israel’s first Prime Minister and Defense Minister. For the first time, Zionism in 
America had taken a unified position for the establishment of a Jewish state. In 1943, Silver 
formed the American Zionist Emergency Council, the purpose of which was to organize “an 
aggressive grass-roots campaign to win congressional and popular support for the Zionist 
cause.”64 By 1944, the Zionist lobby had wholeheartedly convinced both the Democratic and 
the Republican Party to call for an opening of Palestine to an unrestricted Jewish immigration. 
At the end of the World War II, the thought of a foundation of a Jewish national home in 
Palestine had been accepted both socially and politically in the US. The Americans surly 
believed that the Jews had a right to their own country. The Holocaust and the killings of six 
million Jews had made a great impression. The Zionist story was so romantic and so exciting 
that to most Americans it simply seemed right.65 Just after Israel’s creation, an Israel-centered 
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mindset became so embedded in the US, thinking that Israel became essentially a part of 
“being” of the United States. 66  
2.2 President Harry Truman 
When Harry Truman came into office (US President from 1945 to 1953), he was mostly 
concerned about domestic politics and eager to continue the legacy of Franklin D Roosevelt’s 
New Deal welfare policy. But instead, he had to adjust to events at home and abroad, which 
changed the nature of American government, society and diplomacy. Truman had not been 
elected in his own right, but took office after Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945. Truman 
did not come from a moneyed patrician class, but was a common man from Missouri in the 
Midwest. He hated being told what to do, knew the characters in the Bible by hart, and was 
ambitious by nature. But he was never torn by ambition, never tried to appear as something he 
was not. He stood for common sense, and brought common sense to the American people. 
“He held to the old guidelines: Work hard, do your best, speak the truth, assume no airs, trust 
in God, have no fear.”67 Some thought of him as a reflection of the rapidly changing 
twentieth-century America: insecure, cocky and paranoid, and fumbling and stumbling in his 
efforts to understand how rapidly the world was changing.68  
 
Henry A. Wallace, who was Vice-President from 1941-1945 and Secretary of Commerce 
from 1945-46, once said: “I suspect there has never been a president that could move two 
different directions with less time intervening than Truman. He feels completely sincere and 
earnest at all time and is not disturbed in the slightest by the different direction in which his 
mind can go almost simultaneously.”69 Wallace was not a fan of Truman. He became the 
leader of the left-wing democrats, split with the party in 1948, and ran for president on the 
Progressive Party ticket.  
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He opposed the Truman Doctrine, which was “the President’s declaration to Congress that it 
must be the policy of the United States to resist aggression or internal subversion against free 
nations,” in other words the American declaration of the Cold War.70  
 
Truman´s qualities have made him a disputable historical man and president. He had to decide 
whether to use the atomic bomb. He was praised for the signature of the United Nations 
Charter in 1945, for the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the Marshall plan in 1947 (the European 
Recovery Program), the Berlin Airlift from June 1948 to May 1949, the recognition of Israel 
in 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.71  He was criticized for 
more controversial decisions: committing American armed forces in Korea in 1950, bypassing 
Congress and making it his own decision, not America’s and for “upholding the principle of 
civilian control over the military” by negotiating peace with China and firing General 
Douglas MacArthur, commander of American forces in Asia, after MacArthur publicly 
opposed Truman.72  
 
Truman’s decision to recognize the state of Israel in May 1948 has also been criticized. The 
new Jewish state of Israel was declared at midnight May 14, 1948 in Jerusalem, 6:00 p.m. in 
Washington. Eleven minutes later the White House announced de facto recognition. This was 
the same year of the US presidential election, and Truman’s campaign strategy included 
holding on to the votes of African Americans, Jews, and ethnic Catholics. The Jewish votes 
were the key for winning New York, and the Palestine issue was important to the Jewish 
voters. Still, his State Department advisers told Truman “that the issue should be approached 
on basis of reaching decisions based upon intrinsic merit rather than political expediency.”73  
 
It has been argued that Truman’s decision to recognize the American Civil Rights Movement 
and the state of Israel was a calculated decision to be re-elected as a president. Dean Acheson, 
who succeeded George Marshall as US Secretary of State in 1949 concluded in his memoirs 
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that this was not true. Acheson observes that “Truman held deep-seated convictions on many 
subjects, and this was one such case.”74 To support this theory one can consider the cost of the 
American Civil Rights proposal. It was unpopular with the Democrats in the South, and what 
Truman would gain of ethnic black voters he could easily lose of ethnic whites. Still, he told 
his sister Mary Jane Truman in confidence that he believed what he said.75 No matter what 
Truman’s purpose was in recognizing the new Jewish State, it was a symbolic and an 
important act from the US. While Truman’s own experts on foreign affairs considered much 
of his performance as a “sorry spectacle of mismanagement – a comic opera performance”, 
his Middle East policy was approved by most Americans, and was called a “wise decision and 
a heartening one.”76  
 
2.3 The State Department 
America had since 1832 had an official representative in Jerusalem, and the first full-time 
consul was Warder Cresson. He was appointed in 1844, but the first serious and influential 
consul of the 19th century was Selah Merrill, who did not agree with the Blackstone 
Memorial. He reported to the Department of State in 1891 that, “Palestine is not ready for the 
Jews, and the Jews are not ready for Palestine.”77 Moreover, in the view of the State 
Department, Palestine was a foreign country where the US had no control, and there was 
already an indigenous population living there surpassing the Jews in numbers. As an 
additional consideration, the US State Department did not want to create problems with the 
Ottoman Empire.78  
 
The US State Department and its secretary Robert Lansing was not informed about President 
Wilson’s decision to support the Balfour Declaration in November 1917 until December 14. 
Since the Palestine was a British mandate, the Zionist movement inside Britain, with Chaim 
Weizmann as spokesman, was seeking approval for a Jewish national home in Palestine from 
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the British government. Weizmann would later become Israel’s first president. The British 
wanted President Woodrow Wilson to support the idea before it became official. When he 
finally did in November 1917, the fateful statement that was to be known as the Balfour 
Declaration was issued and became a fact.79 Lansing, not even agreeing on the idea of a 
Jewish national home in Palestine, and also being side-stepped by the President before he 
gave his support to the declaration, wrote a letter to the President that expressed his feelings 
about the matter.80 President Wilson answered Lansing that he had had the impression that the 
State Department agreed to the returning of the Palestine to the Jews. On September 21, 1922, 
the US Congress passed a resolution that echoed the Balfour Declaration. It was named the 
Lodge-Fish resolution.81 
 
President Harry S. Truman and the State Department did not manage to work together when it 
came to the Middle Eastern either. After Israel won the Arab-Israel war in 1948, it became 
clear that Israel had no intention of giving up any of its conquests. The US State Department 
insisted that the original borders laid out in the Partition plan should be re-established or 
modified by mutual exchange of land. The Partition resolution (UN Resolution 181 from 29 
of November 1947) stated that after the termination of the British mandate in Palestine, there 
should be two separated and independent Arab and Jewish states and an international regime 
for the City of Jerusalem.82 But the new Prime and Defense minister of Israel, David Ben-
Gurion, had already at the state’s founding in 1948 explained to his political partners that “if 
the UN does not come into account […] and they [the Arab States] make war against us and 
we defeat them […] why should we bind ourselves?”83  
 
From the start, the State Department saw the danger in Truman being too eager to satisfy his 
own domestic political ambition with the support from the Israel lobbyist. In the fall of 1948, 
the Palestine refugee problem had become a major concern for the department and the UN. 
The United Nations had misjudged the outcome of Partition resolution 181. Instead of a 
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peaceful division of Palestine, three-quarters of a million Palestinians became refugees. The 
support for UN resolution 194, from December 11, 1948, the so-called Bernadotte plan, 
which called for the return of the refugees or compensation for their land, became a delicate 
matter for the President. Still, it was yet another election year for Truman and he needed the 
support from the American Jewish society.  It all had to do with timing: The election date was 
2 November, and to support the UN resolution 194 before this date would mean to oppose the 
US Zionists at a critical stage. The State Department told Truman that the US had to support 
the resolution and that it was important to solve the refugee and boundaries conflict. By April 
1949, Truman himself was growing tired of steep Israeli attitude.84  
 
The US State Department emphasized the importance not to aggravate Arab distrust and 
maintain the charges that the “United States remains passive no matter how unreasonable the 
demands of Israel.”85 Truman agreed and sent a strong message to Tel Aviv, but to the 
distress of diplomats and foreign offices, to no use. The UN established the Palestine 
Conciliation Commission, which became known as the PCC, consisting of three members 
France, Turkey and the US. Its purpose was to “achieve a final settlement of all questions 
outstanding between” Arabs and Israelis.86 The peace conference in Lausanne, Switzerland, 
from April to September 1949 was also an unsuccessful effort to solve the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Attending the conference, in addition to the three members of the PCC, was Israel 
and a united Arab delegation represented by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan. The 
Palestinians did not have their own delegate, despite it being their homes and future that were 
at stake.  
 
It became clear that the Jewish-American community had more influence on the US president 
than the US State Department did. And the only thing the State Department could do, was to 
urge Truman to put a stronger pressure on Israel to conciliate or to “admit that the US and UN 
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are unable or unwilling to take the required measures, and therefore that US policy on 
boundaries and refugees can not be carried out.”87   
2.4 The Cold War question  
After the Second World War, the US State Department stressed the importance of continuing 
a good relationship with the Arab world because of the future availability of the Middle 
Eastern oil. Still, the fear of driving the Zionist movement into the hands of the Soviet Union, 
and making the new Israeli State a forward Soviet detachment in the Middle East, was real in 
the eyes of the Americans. Even if the United States had the largest Jewish community in the 
western world after the Second World War, there were still almost three million Jews living in 
Eastern Europe. This happened in the starting phase of the Cold War, and the United States 
and the Soviet Union were competing, not only for political and strategic influence, but also 
for ideological influence. Even Truman was alarmed and asked Ben-Gurion to enquire 
whether Israel was going to become a “red state”.88 The Soviet Union did indeed recognize 
this opportunity to make an influence in the Middle East and prevent Israel from becoming an 
imperialistic Western state. The Soviet Union therefore also endorsed the UN partition 
resolution and was the first to de jure recognize the establishment of the new Israeli state. The 
Soviets did also provide military support to Israel through a third party, Czechoslovakia, 
which probably made a great difference in the Arab-Israel war.89  
 
Even so, Israel pursued the Western, democratic way of living from the start. The institutions 
of the modern Israeli state were founded on parliamentary-democratic principles. Israel’s 
main focus was the security of her statehood, not the Cold War. On the contrary, Israel, as 
other Middle Eastern states, had focus on their immediate environments and used the Cold-
War conflict to satisfy their own national interests. The superpowers were pursuing their own 
agendas, so why shouldn’t Israel and other Arab-states do the same? 90 But Israel had in 1953 
promised the Soviet Union not to “enter into any alliance or agreement that has aggressive 
aims against the Soviet Union.”91 This became an issue later in 1955, when Israel wanted a 
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defense pact with the US, meaning US guarantees for its occupied territory and in return a 
grant for American military bases in Israel. The US response was that it could not guarantee 
“temporary armistice lines; it could only guarantee permanent agreed peace boundaries.”92 
When Israeli’s request became public, Moscow accused Israel for breaking their agreement 
and becoming a Cold War ally to the United States. The US did not feel comfortable with the 
idea of the USSR supporting the Arab states and the US supporting Israel. That could 
jeopardize the US relationship with the Arab states. On the other hand, this was exactly what 
Israel wanted.93 
 
To understand the Cold-War politics in the Middle East, one has to consider the relationship 
between the external powers and the local powers.94 The Palestinians role in the Middle East 
was for the Americans of no strategic importance as the Cold War was concerned. The US 
was concerned about the refugee problem but would directly approach Arab states on local 
issues in order to further their own global issues rather than try to solve the Palestinian 
problem. The Cold War was no issue for the Palestinian refugees either. Stateless and in exile 
after the Arab-Israeli war, foreign policy was not their major concern.  
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3 US diplomacy regarding the Palestinian 
refugees 
There were several reasons for the tragic destiny to three quarter of a million Palestinian 
refugees after the 1948 war. In this diplomatic drama US diplomacy had a lot of saying in 
order to explain Israel’s political achievements and the consequences for the Palestinians.  
The partition policy was initially supported by the US and was the main cause of the Arab-
Israel war. United States’ recognition of the Jewish State, and Israel’s admission to the United 
Nations with the support of the US, gave Israel confidence to assert its policy on the armistice 
borders and to refuse repatriation of the refugees. Moreover, US diplomacy regarding the 
refugee crisis was influenced by the possibility that the Soviet Union could use the situation 
to their advantage. Also, the White House’s indulgence toward Israel and the US State 
Department’s disagreement with the White House became a direct link to the intractable 
Palestinian refugee problem.95  
 
The ongoing negotiations for the armistice lines, conducted by the Arab states and Israel, and 
the refugee problem were interconnected. The United States had two leading figures in these 
negotiations: Ralph Bunche took over from the assassinated mediator Folke Bernadotte and 
continued the negotiation for an armistice. At the same time, the Palestinian Conciliation 
Committee (PCC), established December 11, 1948 when the UN General Assembly had 
passed Resolution 194, was supposed to handle “all questions outstanding” between the 
parties in the region.96 The American Mark F. Ethridge led the commission. President Truman 
caved in under the pressure from the American Zionists, and Ethridge saw the conflicting 
situations that arose as a consequence of the White House’s inaction toward Israel. At the end 
of the Lausanne conference, Paul A. Porter succeeded Ethridge. The United States was the 
mediator for the Arab-Israel war, but did not succeed in leading the parties to compromise, 
and the conflicts remained unresolved. The effort to solve the refugee problem also became a 
failure. Why?   
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3.1 US support for Partition; the cause of the refugee problem 
On May 13, 1947, the UN General Assembly had appointed an eleven-nation Special 
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). This UN committee had the mandate to find a solution to 
the situation for the Jews in Europe, who had survived Hitler’s attempt at genocide, and to the 
escalating conflict in Palestine.97 UNSCOP recommended a partition plan on November 19, 
1947 and forwarded the proposal to an Ad-Hoc Committee that voted on this plan.98 Twenty-
five nations voted for the partition, 13 against and 17 abstained from voting. This meant that 
there was one vote short for the necessary two-thirds majority. To ensure that the next vote in 
the committee would be in the favor of the partition, the Israel lobby and its friends in the 
White House exerted massive pressure on all non-Muslim states in the UN. The General 
Assembly approved the plan ten days later.99  
 
Already on October 11, Truman had ordered the American UN delegation to announce that 
the US supported the partition of Palestine, much to the distress of the State Department.100 
After the termination of the British mandate in Palestine and following approval of the 
Partition Plan, 56 percent of Palestine would become Jewish territory and 43 percent an 
independent Palestinian state. Jerusalem would become a corpus separatum under an 
international regime.101 
 
In early 1948, President Truman became aware of the Palestine refugees’ situation. It became 
clear that the question of boundaries would directly affect the refugee problem. Truman was 
concerned about the situation in Palestine, but he was also concerned about what would 
happen to the Jews, coming from a war-torn Europe and with nowhere to go. The President 
never saw it as the Palestinians loosing their homes and land, but the Arabs having an innate 
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hatred of Jews and not recognizing the Jews’ inherent right to exist in Palestine.102 As 
President Truman, the United Nations was concerned about the European Jewish refugees but 
also worried about the tense situation in Palestine. 103 
 
The Arab Higher Committee, led by the Mufti of Jerusalem that represented Palestinians, did 
not accept the Partition Plan either.104 For the UN, the US and the British, the Palestinians had 
become an obstacle to a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem. The US State 
Department did not think of the partition as a good alternative for a permanent solution in 
Palestine but complied with the White House. The Zionist leaders accepted the plan and saw 
opportunities in the partition. Resolution 181 confirmed to the Zionists that there no longer 
would be a question of whether a Jewish homeland should exist, but where the boundaries 
would be. Truman at this point received 35,000 letters from American Jews concerning the 
partition of Palestine. He wrote to Senator Claude Pepper, “I put all in a pile and struck a 
match to it – I never looked at a single one of the letters because I felt the United Nations 
Committee was acting in a judicial capacity and should not be interfered with.”105 Truman 
was at this point so annoyed with all the demands from the Zionists that he forbade them to 
come to the White House. This was not the last time Truman would become furious because 
of Jewish unwillingness to compromise.  
3.2 The State Department’s campaign for making Truman turn on the 
partition 
The year 1948 was the so-called “Silly Season” or presidential election year.106 Truman, who 
had not been elected in his own right but taken office after Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 
1945, was eager to show that he could take office by his own and become the next US 
President. The election was scheduled for November, and Truman was a low-ranked 
candidate. In January, the State Department realized that the partition policy in Palestine 
could not be implemented without violence. A civil war had broken out in Palestine and by its 
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support of partition, the Truman administration enabled and contributed to the unforeseen 
arising refugee problem. The refugees received no attention from the higher US political 
administration in the early winter of 1948. They were too busy “extricate itself from support 
of partition without seeming to.”107 The question of the emerging new Jewish state also called 
for the top officials’ attention, and Truman had his hands full with the upcoming presidential 
election and his presidential campaign.108 
 
It was difficult for Truman to change his position on the partition, since he needed the support 
from the American Jewish community and from the regular Americans who believed in 
United States support for a Jewish State. The Zionists were openly thankful for Truman’s 
support of the partition and the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. 
Consequently, they contributed to his campaign and obtained votes.109 The State Department 
was furious and meant that Truman held domestic policy over Middle Eastern policy. In 
Palestine, the violence escalated and the number of refugees increased every day. George F. 
Kennan, the State Department’s Director of Policy Planning, made it clear that “the 
continuation of the partition policy represented disaster for the United States.”110 
 
The State Department started a campaign to try to convince Truman to change his mind and 
suspend the partition. Truman had since the start of his presidency had an ambivalent 
relationship to the officials in the State Department; he called them the “Striped Pants Boys” 
and was never comfortable with these officials.111 On January 19, 1948, Kennan wrote a top-
secret document to Truman, where he explained why the United States should not support the 
partition. He told Truman that sponsoring the partition would “result in deep-seated 
antagonism for the U.S. in many sections of the Moslem world over a period of many 
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years.”112 Kennan was particular thinking of Saudi Arabia. Since the days of former President 
Roosevelt, the American had developed a good working relation with King Ibn Saud. The US 
had contributed financially to the exploration of oil in Saudi Arabia and had military rights in 
the country. But because of the partition plan and the American support to it, Saudi Arabia 
had been under pressure from the other Arab states to break with the US.113  
 
Another issue for the State Department was that the US could be pressured into sending 
troops to Palestine in order to maintain the borders defined by the partition. Obviously, the 
American voters would not welcome such a decision so soon after the Second World War. 
Kennan suspected that Truman had already promised the American Zionists too much. 
Therefore, instead of maintaining the borders on both sides, US troops would only protect the 
Jewish cause in Palestine and oppose Arab resistance.114  
 
Truman had no doubts that the Jews deserved their own state, but started to doubt that the 
partition was the way to go. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense 
Department both agreed to change the US’s partition policy. The Defense Department 
opposed sending troops to Palestine, concluding that the Soviet Union consequently also 
would get the opportunity to send their own troops and get access to Palestine. This was 
something that the Americans really feared and did not want to happen.115 
3.3 Truman reverses his stand on the partition 
Truman eventually understood that he had to reverse his stand on the partition. It was a 
delicate matter since Truman already had a reputation of being an inconsistent President and 
he did not want to reinforce this reputation. His advisers came up with a plan to convince the 
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UN Security Council to bring the Palestine conflict back to the UN. Here the partition should 
be reconsidered and “to have the Council explore other avenues of a peaceful settlement of 
the problem. Specifically [USA] should endeavor to bring about conciliation or arbitration of 
the matter.”116 The US should not advocate sending armed forces into Palestine; it could not 
be appropriate to use military force to uphold the partition.117 By doing this, the US did not 
have to worry about sending troops. The second part was to establish some sort of UN 
trusteeship to step in when the British mandate was over. The presidential election was 
imminent, and for Truman it was important to have his back covered by not withdrawing 
directly his support for the partition. He therefore underlined that the adoption of a trusteeship 
was not the same as abandoning his stand on the partition. As soon as the bloodshed in 
Palestine was over, the partition could be established.118   
 
On February 24, UN Ambassador Warren Austin presented the US’s first message to the UN 
Security Council, where it was received without comment. The American Zionists and 
Truman’s White House adviser, Clark Clifford, who was close to the Zionists, knew that the 
partition in Palestine was in danger and argued strongly for the fulfillment of the plan. 
Clifford wrote two memorandums to Truman. In the first one, he pointed out the Soviet 
Union’s advantage if a military vacuum were to occur in Palestine due to the reversed 
partition policy by the US. In the second memorandum, he stated that the US would “appear 
in the ridiculous role of trembling before threats of a few nomadic desert tribes.”119  
 
On March 19, Ambassador Austin asked for a temporary UN trusteeship and a suspension of 
implementing partition in Palestine in view of the ongoing civil war and the resulting refugee 
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problem.120 This second message to the Security Council was not as well received as the first. 
The American Zionists were furious and felt betrayed. Truman had supported partition and in 
fact set the table for a Jewish state in Palestine when the British mandate ended. Just the day 
before Ambassador Austin announced the US reversal from the partition policy, Chaim 
Weizmann, Truman’s old friend who was later to become Israel’s first president, had visited 
the White House. Truman had promised Weizmann that there would be no change in US 
policy toward Palestine.121 But Truman had to back out and go back on his promises to 
Weizmann. To maintain his promise, Truman later assured Weizmann in a personal letter that 
he would support the creation of a Jewish state.122 The whole matter became an 
embarrassment for Truman and he blamed the State Department for intentionally undermining 
him. “[T]he State Department pulled the rug from under me today,” Truman wrote in his 
diary.123  
3.4 Truman’s recognition of the state Israel  
The situation had become a non-win for the Palestinians. They had no organized resistance 
and failed to realize that political reality sealed their fate and effectively excluded them from 
the policy-making framework.124 The Zionist leaders were well aware of the UN’s goodwill 
for the creation of a Jewish state. Thomas C. Wasson, the US General Consul in Jerusalem, 
reported to Washington three months before the British mandate ended that Jewish officials 
were telling him “that the fate of the future Jewish state was tied to the fate of the UN and that 
the world community would not let either one go under.”125 On April 23, 1948 Weizmann 
received another personal message from President Truman assuring him that even if the UN 
General Assembly would not adopt the trusteeship proposal, the US would recognize the 
Jewish state when it was established.126   
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At the White House, the upcoming election was in focus. In May 1948, election pollsters 
showed that Truman was not one of the favorites to become the new president. The matter of 
recognition of Israel was of political importance domestically for Truman because of the 
votes he would receive from the Jewish society and all the Americans that supported the 
creation of a Jewish state. Therefore, on May 12, Truman called for a meeting at the White 
House to discuss the establishment of a Jewish state and US recognition of it.127 At the 
meeting, the presidential counselor, Clark Clifford, was eager to convince the Secretary of 
State, George Marshall, and the Under-Secretary of State, Robert Lovlett, that an early 
recognition of the inevitable Jewish state by the US was the only hope to gain an advantage in 
the Middle East on the Soviet Union. In his opinion, the Soviet Union wanted to prevent 
Israel from becoming an imperialistic western state. And the White House feared that driving 
the Zionist movement into the hands of the Soviet Union would make the new Israeli State a 
forward Soviet detachment in the Middle East.128 The representatives from the State 
Department meant that this argument “was a very transparent attempt to win the Jewish 
vote”.129 Marshall became furious and said to Truman that “if the President were [sic] to 
follow Mr. Clifford’s advice and if in the elections [Marshall] were [sic] to vote, [he] would 
vote against the President”.130 
 
Still, two days before the state of Israel became a fact, Chaim Weizmann wrote to President 
Truman:  
I deeply hope that the US, which under your leadership has done so much to find a just solution, 
will promptly recognize the Provisional Government of the new Jewish state. The world, I think, 
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would regard it as especially appropriate that the greatest living democracy should be the first to 
welcome the newest into the family of nations.131 
 
On May 14, eleven minutes after midnight Palestinian time, the US recognized the State of 
Israel de-facto. The response from Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon to Israel’s new 
declaration of independence was to attack the newly founded Jewish state. The State 
Department’s reaction was nearly an open revolt. The transparent political motives for 
Truman instantly to recognize the new Jewish state were obvious to all. Truman had based his 
decision on purely domestic considerations and he had not recognized that the problem was 
international. He had not considered the basic US democratic belief “that it would be contrary 
to the policy which the United States has always followed of respecting the wishes of a large 
majority of the local inhabitants with the respect of their form of government.”132  
3.5 The consequence of the Arab-Israel war  
Between 600 000 and 760 000 Palestinians became refugees because of the 1948 war.133  On 
June 16, 1948, the Provincial Government of Israel decided to close the borders, and the 
refugees that tried to return to their homes were to be shot.134 The Israelis regarded the 
Palestinians’ right to return to their former homes after the war as not a right, but a Palestinian 
ambit claim.135 This means an extravagant initial demand made in expectation of an eventual 
counter-offer and compromise.136 For Israel, it meant that it held return of the refugees only to 
be achieved by a final peace settlement with the neighboring Arab states. The Arabs claimed 
that the Palestinians were protected under international law. The Israelis stated that there was 
no basis for that in international law. 137   
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The Arab - Israel war lasted officially to January 7, 1949, when the UN managed to negotiate 
a ceasefire, but in March, there was still fighting going on.138 The majority of the refugees 
fled to the neighboring Arab states, the Gaza Strip and to the West Bank. After the war, the 
situation had changed dramatically. No longer was the November 29, 1947 UN settlement of 
any interest to Israel. They had gained more land than promised by the partition and had 
become a much more homogenous Jewish state than they ever expected because of the 
Palestinian flight.139 For the Arab states, the refugee problem and their defeat to the Jewish 
state could not be accepted.  
 
The unrest in Palestine and the refugee problem had become a major headache for Truman 
and the UN. The Middle East was of importance to all the Western states. Its oil was a 
resource that would supply not only the Berlin Airlift (June 1948-May 1949) but also Western 
states in the future. The Arab states controlled it, and they regarded Israel as a Western 
outpost in the region. Thus for the US, instability between the Arabs and the Israeli was not 
beneficial, especially in the context of the starting Cold War. Because of the communist 
threat, US diplomats were alarmed “by global Cold War concerns [and] concurred in the view 
that the masses of disgruntled refugees were potential tools of Communism and posed a threat 
to the pro-western Arab host governments.”140 By mid-1948, the United States had to face the 
Palestinian refugee problem. The US State Department urged President Truman to act.  
3.6 Bernadotte 
On May 20, 1948, the United Nations appointed Count Folke Bernadotte to be the mediator in 
the Palestine conflict. He was to “[p]romote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of 
Palestine.”141 Bernadotte managed to make the first truce that lasted from June 11 to July 9, 
1948. His proposal was that the City of Jerusalem and the area known as Negev should be a 
part of Arab territory, something the Provisional Government of Israel regarded as disastrous. 
According to Ben-Gurion, Israel needed the Negev to settle new Jewish immigrants.  Galilee, 
on the other hand, should in Bernadotte’s plan be defined as Jewish territory. However, the 
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Israelis had already occupied the Galilee, and had no interest negotiating for a land they 
already had. The boundaries were in reality made up by the military frontiers.142  
 
Peace between the Arab states and Israel, was closely the connected with the return of the 
Palestinian refugees. Therefore, on June 17, 1948, Bernadotte met with Foreign Minister 
Moshe Shertok, who later change name to Sharett, and asked if Israel could take back 300 000 
refugees. Sharett responded that the question about letting any refugees return could not be 
answered as long as the war was going on. But he managed to let it shine through that Israel 
might take some of the refugees back when the war was over. Israel had not yet taken any 
stand on the refugee problem, he told Bernadotte. This was not the case. Just the day before, 
Prime Minister Ben Gurion had made it clear to the Israeli government that “no refugees were 
to return and this would be our policy.”143 In August, Truman was confronted by the State 
Department about the tragedy that was taking place. The State Department told the President 
that there were 300 000 to 400 000 refugees, and their condition was horrible.144 The pressure 
on Israel to discuss the Palestine refugees and their return increased. The same month 
Bernadotte told Sharett that Israel was “driving too hard a bargain” and that Israel’s “stock 
was dropping”.145 Sharett just answered that in the end it was in everyone’s interest that the 
Arab minority in Israel would be a small one.146  
 
The Americans were getting tired of Israel’s intransigence. James McDonald, the first US 
ambassador to Israel, met with Ben Gurion on August 20, 1948. He told the Prime Minister 
that if Israel did not reconsider their unwillingness to take back a substantial number of 
Palestinian refugees, the US had to consider implementing sanctions towards Israel. Ben 
Gurion told McDonald that despite this threat, Israel could not compromise the security of the 
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state by letting refugees return before the war was over.147 “There is little if any possibility of 
Arabs returning to their homes in Israel or Jewish-occupied Palestine,” wrote McDonald.148 
This was confirmed on September 12 when Sharett instructed the Israel delegation to the 
meeting of the UN General Assembly to stay with the consensus of the June 16 statement 
from Ben-Gurion. Sharett also instructed that “in informal conversations, the delegation 
w[ould] explain that it was better that the problem be solved by settling the refugees in the 
neighboring countries.”149 
 
On September 17, 1948, Bernadotte was assassinated. The convoy of three cars in which he 
was riding was stopped at a roadblock in Jewish-controlled West Jerusalem. Three gunmen 
attacked the car where the 54-year-old Swedish Second World War hero was shot to death 
together with a French officer, Andre Serot, sitting next to him. Behind the assassination 
stood Jewish terrorists from Lehi (Lohamei Herut Israel), better known as the Stern Gang. 
Three leaders from the terrorist group had given the orders. One of them was Yitzhak Shamir, 
who became leader of the Likud Party from 1983 to 1992 and Israel’s Prime Minister in 1983. 
The murderers were never prosecuted, and in 1950 Israel admitted its laxity in the 
investigation and paid $54 628 in indemnity to the UN.150  
3.7 Bernadotte’s final report 
Bernadotte’s final report had been completed the day before he was assassinated and was 
publicized September 20, 1948. He stated in his report that the refugees, who wanted to return 
to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors, should be allowed to do so as soon as 
possible. Bernadotte’s report was stated in the UN Resolution 194 on December 11, 1948 the 
same year. The resolution also stated that Israel had to pay certain compensations to those 
refugees who decided not to return.151 “It would be an offence against the principles of 
elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to 
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their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine,” Bernadotte had confirmed.152 UN 
Resolution 194 called out for action, and the US could not avoid getting involved.  
 
In October 1948, the State Department reported about “a tragic disaster of catastrophic 
proportions” and the UN established a thirty-two-million dollars refugee relief program.153 
Foreign Service officer Stanton Griffis was appointed by the State Department to lead the 
fund, and the US Congress was convinced to raise half of the aid money. At the end of 1948, 
Truman embraced the solution that Israel had to repatriate the refugees. Repatriation was 
important not only for humanitarian but also for political reasons. Israel, in Truman’s mind, 
should let those refugees who wanted to come back do so as a token of their willingness to 
cooperate for peace with the neighboring Arab states. Repatriation also concerned US 
national security. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson meant that the refugee crises would 
“aggravate conditions of insecurity, unrest, and political instability, with attendant 
opportunity for Soviet penetration.”154 
3.8 The Mediators 
Ralph Bunche inherited the role as UN mediator. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950 
for his work on the Palestine conflict, but his eagerness in pursuing a solution for the return of 
the refugees was never the same as that of Bernadotte.155 December 11, 1948 The Palestinian 
Conciliation Commission (PCC) was established. It was an UN commission that was 
supposed to find a solution to all outstanding questions and help all the refugees that wanted 
to return to their homes in Palestine.156 The commission consisted of Claude de Boisanger 
(France), Mark F. Ethridge (USA) and Hussein C. Yalcin (Turkey). It soon became clear that 
the negotiations would divide into separate camps. The PCC was entrusted to follow up the 
UN Resolution 194. The Bernadotte Plan also presented territorial suggestions between the 
Arab states and Israel that differed from the Partition Plan. The PCC did not manage to agree 
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on the border issue and finally omitted the whole question.157 Bunche on the other hand 
continued the negotiation for temporary armistice borders between representatives from 
Israel, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon. In the beginning of February, it was decided 
that PCC should leave the border negotiation to Bunche.158  
 
Ethridge, the US PCC member, soon became the leader of the commission. If the commission 
should have any influence at all, it was important to have a strong powerful state supporting 
it. This way, the US dominated the commission.159 The Palestinian refugee problem became 
the main concern for the PCC. It was the major obstacle for peace negotiations. During the 
spring of 1949, the PCC and the US tried to solve the refugee problem with little help from 
others. A technical committee was established in order to find out how many refugees existed, 
how many could be settled in the neighboring Arab states, and how they could be 
economically rehabilitated.160 The PCC also arranged for a peace conference in Lausanne. 
The conference was an attempt to establish peace treaties between the Arab States and Israel 
and discuss the refugee problem. It lasted from April 27 to September 15, 1949. The Palestine 
conflict had two major issues that could not be separated: Territory and the Palestinian 
refugees. In addition to the PCC, an Arab delegation represented by Syria, Egypt, Lebanon 
and Jordan as well as an Israel delegation attended the conference. Ahmad Shuqayri, 
representing the refugees and attending as a “Palestinian advisor,” was affiliated with the 
Syrian delegation.161  
3.9 Truman’s turn on US policy 
Just before the Lausanne conference started in April, Mark Ethridge wrote a personal letter to 
President Truman where he pointed out Israel’s inflexibility on the conflict and the refugee 
problem. Israelis trusted strong military security over a good relationship with their neighbors. 
Truman was at this point fed up with Israel’s attitude and wrote back to Ethridge, “I am rather 
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disgusted with the manner the Jews are approaching the refugee problem.”162 Truman 
approached Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, but to no use. In fact, it had the opposite effect. The 
answer to Truman’s approach from the Israelis was that “They intended to bring about a 
change in the position of the United States Government… through means available to them in 
the United States.”163 The State Department tried to run a hard line, and responded by 
suggesting that the US withheld $49 million from a $100 million Export-Import Bank loan to 
Israel unless Israel took back at least 200 000 refugees. George C. McGhee, US coordinator 
on Palestine matters had a meeting with the Israeli ambassador to the US, Eliahu Elath and 
informed him about the money that might be withheld. A few hours later McGhee “received a 
message from the White House that the President wished to dissociate himself from any 
withholding of the Ex-Im bank loan.”164 In other words, the Jewish lobby had a grip on 
President Truman, which made him overrule the State Department’s Palestine policy.  
 
In an interview with Ethridge in1974 by Richard D. McKinzie, Ethridge explained his 
frustration during the negotiations on the conflict in the Middle East. 
Ethridge: The Israelis were not going to give up an inch of land[.] […] [T]he U.N. 
said Israel must give back, they must take their refugees back, you know, there was no 
way of reconciliation. 
McKinzie: No way that pressure could be used to bring it about, that you saw? 
Ethridge: No, no. Truman let me down on two phases of the Palestine thing. One of 
them was, I recognized that Israel was going to be very tough to deal with, and Israel 
was desperately trying to get into the U.N. I got an[sic] promise out of the President 
that we would withhold recognition of Israel in the U.N. Hell, I hadn’t been out there a 
month before we moved for recognition of Israel in the U.N. We moved it. We just 
didn’t vote for it, we moved it. Another was, we were to give Israel some money 
through the Export-Import Bank, and I got him to promise to hold that up until we 
could get some positive indication. Well, They released that before I got through with 
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the Commission. 
McKinzie: There wasn’t much leverage, then, again.  
Ethridge: No, I didn’t have any, I didn’t have any. That’s one reason I said,  
“I’m going home.” 165 
 
3.10 Israel’s UN admission 
From December 1948, Israel’s admission to the UN was being discussed in the Security 
Council, the question being what should come first of peace between Israel and the Arabs or 
Israeli admission to the UN. Israel held the peace process hostage to the claim that UN 
membership “became a cornerstone of Israel’s international admission campaign”. 166 Israel 
argued that in order to be equal in the negations process with the other Arab-states, it should 
be admitted. And that for the sake of United Nation’s own prestige, the membership should be 
as universal as possible. The UN Secretary General, the Norwegian Trygve Lie, who was a 
convinced Zionist, was on Israel’s side. Truman also supported Israel’s membership 
application, but the State Department was not as convinced as Truman. It feared that Israel 
would expand its territories after being admitted and the possibility that the Arab world would 
unite in anger. Finally, there was the dilemma of opening up for Israel’s admission to the UN 
that could lead to a broader admission policy and eventually admission for the USSR’s 
candidates. This could disturb the balance in UN. On December 17, 1948, the Security 
Council rejected Israel’s application. 167 
 
But Israel did not give up and applied again for UN admission on February 24, 1949. At the 
same time, Bunche, who was negotiating armistice between Israel and the Arab states at the 
island of Rhodes, reported that a general agreement between the belligerents had been signed. 
This turned out positive For Israel’s application for UN membership. The Security Council 
voted I favor of Israel’s admission, and recommended it to the General Assembly as the 
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procedures was. The next step was to get the application through in the General Assembly. By 
April the US was getting tired of Israel’s steeliness about the Palestinian refugee problem and 
the way Israel had handled the Jerusalem question. Israel’s application for admission could be 
in danger because of this, at least if the British representatives to the UN and Ethridge got 
their way. Ethridge meant that the UN membership could be used as a reward for Israel’s 
cooperativeness on the refugee and Jerusalem issues.168  
 
Eban addressed the Ad Hoc Political Committee on May 5, 1949. The General Assembly had 
decided that the admission question for Israel should be treated in this committee before it got 
its final decision in the General Assembly. Several UN members were dissatisfied by Israel’s 
unwillingness to comply with UN Resolution 194. Eban told the committee that the “Israeli 
government was earnestly anxious to contribute to the solution of the refugee problem.”169 
 
His speech conveyed nothing new and was not at all the conciliatory statement that the PCC 
and the US State Department wanted to hear. But once more, President Weizmann had 
interfered, and had written a letter to Truman about the UN membership question. The letter 
had satisfied the President. The matter of Jerusalem came before the matter of the Palestinian 
refugees. Eban knew that Israel had to consolidate on the Jerusalem issue. Israel did not 
accept to the Internationalization of Jerusalem. By using a strategy that emphasized the truce 
lines on ground instead of the UN Partition Plan, Israel limited the internationalization of the 
whole city to only the Holy Places. By addressing this to the UN, Eban managed to please the 
Vatican and by this the Latin-American bloc who considered the question for free access to 
the Holy Places in Jerusalem crucial. Therefore as long as the White House was pleased, 
Israel did not have to yield on the refugee question.  On May 11, 1949, the United States co-
sponsored UN General Assembly Resolution 273 (III), which admitted Israel as the 59th 
member state of the UN.170 
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3.11 A deadlocked situation 
At the Lausanne conference, the negotiations were deadlocked from the beginning. Israel 
would not let the refugees return to their homes, and the Arab neighbor states did not 
welcome the refugees, at least not without any compensation. Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and 
Jordan had absorbed most of the refugees. They “demanded repatriation of the dispossessed 
and linked all progress towards a resolution of the conflict to Israeli agreement to a return.”171 
At the same time, the Arab states saw the refugees and their undeserved status as a strong 
argument in the negotiations. The Arabs argued that if the Israelis did not allow the return of 
the refugees, it would cause western skeptics towards Israel on humanitarian grounds. But 
Israel claimed that if it did take back the refugees, it could cause political and military 
instability, their return would constitute fifth column.172  
 
For the Israelis the refugees were the ticket to recognition and peace with the Arab states. The 
Israelis did not want to give back hard-earned territories or accept the principle of territorial 
compensation related to the 1947 boundaries. That would jeopardize the Jewish plan to create 
a purely Jewish state. Israel said that they had gone as far as they could possible go 
concerning repatriation of the refugees and nothing more could be done before a final peace 
settlement had been reached.173 The refugees had consequently become a political weapon for 
both the Arab states and the Israelis. In the summer of 1949, the Israelis had to answer to the 
accusations from the US for not being cooperative about the refugees. Trying to bypass the 
US State Department and communicate directly with the White House, where Israel had a 
softer spot, did at this point not succeed. Truman was getting tired of Israel’s uncompromising 
attitude and told the Jewish leaders who had called on him that “unless they were prepared to 
play the game properly and conform to the rules, they were probably going to loose one of 
their best friends.”174  
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3.12 Sharett’s statement to Knesset  
On June 15, 1949 Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, held a speech to the Knesset. It summed 
up Israeli arguments for not allowing the refugees to return to their homes now in Israel.175 
 
In Sharett’s speech, he confronted the neighbor Arab states and stated that the refugees were 
not Israel’s responsibility, but that of the Arab states. He considered the Israelis to be “playing 
along” for justice, and argued that they had accepted the UN partition resolution unlike the 
Arab states.176 He said, “[i]n the wake of the [Arab-Israel] war, and as a result of the collapse 
of the rebellion and the invasion, there came the Arab exodus.”177 The security and the 
existence of the newly established Jewish state was most important for Sharett, who argued, 
“[that a] mass repatriation of refugees without peace with the neighboring countries would 
thus be an act of suicide on the part of Israel. No State in the world placed in [Israel’s] 
position would think of doing anything of the sort.”178  
 
Sharett continued by stating that the economy of the displaced Palestinians had been ruined 
and that their property had not been handed over but abandoned. It could not be expected by 
the new state of Israel to resettle the refugees. “A State which harness[ed] all its energies and 
resources to the great task of absorbing the new [Jewish] immigrants, could [therefore] not 
possibly take upon itself this additional burden.”179 However, Sharett had recognized the 
annoyance of the US, and he knew that there had to be some atonement from Israel’s side. He 
proposed that Israel could help reunite families, allow a certain number of refugees to return, 
and pay compensation to the refugees for the land they had lost. In return, Sharett wanted 
peace negotiations with the neighboring Arab states: “Those who attacked us cannot have it 
both ways, refuse to enter into peace negotiations with us and at the very same time insist that 
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we readmit refugees for whose plight they alone are responsible.”180 Sharett also used UN 
Resolution 194 literally in order to emphasize that the Israelis had not violated the resolution. 
He pointed out that the resolution said that those wishing to live at peace with their neighbors 
are entitled to come back. “But who [was] going to examine the sincerity of the desire for 
peace evinced by the returning Palestinians; and who [could] guarantee that it [would] last,” 
Sharett asked.181 He continued by confirming that the resolution provided Palestinian refugees 
be admitted "at the earliest practicable date. “Who [could] say that this practicable date [had] 
already arrived,” Sharett rhetorically questioned.182 
 
The Arab states wanted to consider compensation only if Israel resettled some of the refugees, 
but Sharett questioned whether Israel should consider such an appeasement and whether the 
Arab states deserved such a remission. Was it not the Arabs, he argued, who had misled the 
refugees by telling them that they could return as soon as the Jews were defeated and “their 
survivors thrown into the sea? What justified the belief that such appeasement would bring 
peace and that such peace would last?”183 At the end of his statement, Sharett pointed out that 
the UN did not reassure Israel of peace, and that Israel would stand alone if aggression 
towards the new Jewish state would occur. He added that the relationship with the US was 
vital, but could not be compromised by the security of the state. 184  
 
On July 5, Sharett came up with an exact number of refugees that were to be admitted to 
return. To erase US pressure, the admission of 100,000 refugees would show the UN and the 
US that Israel was willing to compromise. In return, Israel would negotiate for peace as long 
as it could retain all its controlled territories and resettle the returning refugees wherever they 
found reasonable. Ben-Gurion did not like the idea. He thought that 100,000 would be a 
danger to the security of the state and that the Arab states would never accept the proposal. 
But after he understood that it was just a diplomatic maneuver to ease the pressure from US, 
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he went along with it. In fact there were only 65 000 or 70 000 refugees since 25 000 had 
already returned illegally and 10 000 were to return as part of the family reunion scheme.185  
 
To assure that Truman would admit the proposal, the President was early and surreptitiously 
asked about the 100 000 refugees.186 Following a positive informal response from Truman, 
Sharett formally asked Truman on July 28, and the proposal was introduced to the PCC on 
August 3, 1949. The American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, opposed the proposal and 
criticized the “take it or leave it attitude” from Israel. The PCC thought it was absurd and the 
Arab states said that it was “less than symbolic”.187  
 
The proposal was formally rejected on August 9. Sharett tried to overturn the decision by 
turning Truman against the State Department. But it backfired on Israel. Truman became so 
furious that he suspended the $49 million balance of Israel’s $100 million Export-Import 
Bank loan. Israel disliked the decision, and at a lunch meeting that McGhee had with Israel’s 
Ambassador Eliahu Elath on August 25, the Ambassador emotionally told McGhee: “The 
action taken by the bank at the apparent behest of the State Department clearly constituted a 
breach of promise.” 188 McGhee on the other hand was confident in “achieving an ultimate 
solution and was particularly hopeful that events might take a more constructive turn with the 
setting up of the Economic Survey Mission.”189  
3.13 The outcome of the Lausanne conference  
The Lausanne conference became a disaster. Nothing came out of it, and the refugees were 
still just a political card. The Israelis were neither disappointed nor surprised that their 
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100,000-refugee proposal had been turned down. They had time on their side. The armistice 
boundaries became de-facto boundaries, and the refugees did not return.190.  
 
The thirty-two-million dollar refugee relief program established in October 1948 was 
supposed to end in December 1949. The State Department argued that something had to be 
done to the humanitarian crisis to which the Palestinian refugees were subjected. With 
Truman’s approval, the State Department decided that the PCC would establish an Economic 
Survey Mission (ESM) that would “examine the economic situation in the countries affected 
by the recent hostilities, and to make recommendations to the Commission for an integrated 
program.”191 The report that came out of ESM’s survey, the so-called Clapp report, prompted 
the General Assembly to take significant action and to aid the refugees.  
 
The General Assembly had lost trust in Washington to help solve the refugee crisis. On 
December 8, 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was established. 
The observation from the UN was that it “[was] necessary to prevent conditions of starvation 
and distress” among by then 726 000 refugees.192 During the following years, not much came 
out of US efforts to try to solve the refugee problem. Repatriation was the refugees’ only 
wish; resettlement would be to concede that their Palestinian properties were lost forever. 
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4 United States policy concerning the Israeli 
confiscation of abandoned individual Palestinian 
properties 
The Israeli refusal of the return of the Palestinian refugees to their abandoned properties was 
closely linked to the new Jewish settlements in Israel. The Israelis seized the abandoned 
Palestinian properties, and new Jewish settlers cultivated the land. The mass exodus of 
Palestinians in 1947-48 resulted in more than 725 000 Palestinians leaving their farmlands, 
animals, tools, factories, bank accounts and personal belongings. The non-returning refugees 
had left behind considerable assets, and the new Jewish state quickly confiscated the 
abandoned properties.193   
 
After the Lausanne conference, Washington’s concern about the Palestinian properties 
remained within parameters acceptable to Israel. The US government made no serious effort 
to oppose Israel’s confiscation and resettlement of Palestinian properties.194 In fact, 
Washington made sure that the United Nation’s prime tool for handling the refugee problem 
and the loss of properties, namely the Palestinian Conciliation Committee (PCC), never 
crossed the “red lines”. They were undeclared parameters intended to guide the PCC in the 
way that Washington found fit. The “most important of these were that repatriation was not 
feasible and that refugee compensation must be in lieu of repatriation.”195 Washington had 
given up the alternative of allowing the refugees to return to their homeland and instead made 
the PCC focus on the technical issues relating to compensation.196  
 
Why did the US follow such a policy? The US favored peace between Israel and the Arab 
states mostly as protection of their own interest in the Middle East, and the Cold War had 
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priority before the Arab-Israel conflict. The State Department advised the Israeli government 
to make concessions in order to achieve peace, but the US government refrained from taking 
major initiatives. Truman had always had a weakness for Israel, and the White House and its 
advisers, who believed in the rightfulness of the new established Israel, competed with the 
State and Defense Department for the President’s mind. The latter wanted to have closer 
relation with the Arab because of national security concern and the Middle East preservation 
of oil sources. This internal division limited the United States’ peacemaking efforts in the 
Middle East and the return of Palestinian properties.197  
 
4.1 An occupation by the Jewish Immigrants 
In 1948, neither the United State government nor anyone else had envisioned that the 
Palestinian refugees were to become permanent refugees. They expected that they would 
return to their respective homes when the war was over. The abandon Palestinian properties 
had an upcoming harvest in the summer of 1948. This became an important issue, not only for 
the new Jewish settlers, but also for the existence of the new Jewish state. In June, the 
Provincial Government of Israel had provided certain legal frameworks that would justify the 
Israeli takeover of the abandoned properties.  
 
The Agriculture Ministry together with the Arab Property Department (at first a branch of the 
Minority Affairs Ministry and from June 1948 part of the office of the Custodian for 
Abandoned (later Absentees’) Property) organized Jewish settlers to harvest abandoned 
Palestinian crops. In a time when Israel desperately needed food to all their immigrants, they 
could not leave the crops to rot. The harvesting of the fields connected the Jewish immigrants 
to the Palestinian properties and made them want to stay. During the summer of 1948, Jewish 
settlers “appealed to the Agriculture Ministry, the Jewish National Fund, and other land-
allocating bodies for permanent leaseholds and possession.”198 This became one of the major, 
non-official reasons for not letting the Palestinian refugees return to their homes. It secured 
the Israeli procurement of Arab land. The Israelis, on the other hand, stopped the refugees 
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when they tried to collect the crops from the abandoned fields. On June 13, 1948, Israeli 
government ordered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to “prevent completely all Arabs reaping 
in areas conquered by the IDF.”199  On July 3, the Secretary General of the Arab League, 
Abdul Rahman Azzam complained to the UN mediator Folke Bernadotte about the situation 
for the Palestinian refugees. They were starving and had the right to harvest their own crops. 
Outside observers, among them Bernadotte and the American charge ‘affairs to Damascus, 
Loy W. Henderson, criticized the Jewish settlement and the harvesting of Palestinian 
refugees’ crops, but they did not recognize the political motives for the Israeli acquisition of 
Palestinian property.200 Bernadotte himself reported to the UN that he had seen “Haganah 
organizing and supervising removal [of] contents [from] Arab houses in Ramle, which he 
understood [were] being distributed among newly arrived Jewish immigrants.”201 Nothing 
came out of Bernadotte’s report.  
4.2 Israeli continued expansionism leaving no room for the Palestinians  
The lack of any action on part of the US gave Israel the courage to continue its expansion 
after the 1948 war. In March 1949, before the Lausanne conference took place, US State 
Department officials realized that any repatriation of Palestinian refugees would likely be in 
small numbers. Their hope was that US economic aid would convince the refugees to 
surrender their very natural desire to return to their “… fig tree and vine in favor of some 
other fig tree and vine elsewhere.”202 By aiding the refugees deprived from their properties, 
means and livelihood, the UN and the US enabled Israel to use the same properties for new 
Jewish immigrants. The return had become physically impossible. Israelis had occupied 
Palestinian houses and properties, including in areas not given to Israel by the partition 
decision. Others properties had been destroyed. There was practically no room left.203  
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At the Lausanne conference, Israel agreed to repatriate 100 000 refugees. The offer was 
supposed to show the UN and the US that Israel was willing to compromise. In return, Israel 
would negotiate for peace as long as it could retain all its controlled territories and resettle the 
returning refugees wherever they found reasonable.204 In other words, the refugees would 
probably not return to their original homes and villages. The US and the UN rejected the 
proposal, but it showed how eager the Israelis were to hold on to already cultivated land.205  
 
After the Lausanne conference, it became clear that Israel would not relinquish any conquered 
land or possessed Palestine properties. On the contrary, in 1948-49, Israel had absorbed 
250 000 Jewish immigrants on top of the thousands of European Jews that came before the 
Israeli independence. In a conversation on October 20, 1950, Israel’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sharett told US State Secretary Acheson that it was Israel’s duty to accept all Jews 
that wanted to come and that he hoped to receive 200 000 annually over the next few years. 
Because of this, Sharett hoped that the US would contribute financial assistance to Israel in 
order to “absorb immigrants and aid the Arab states to resettle the Palestine refugees.”206 
Acheson argued that the great number of Jewish immigrants added tension to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. To him, Israel’s expansionism and the fact that the newly arrived Jews occupied the 
abandoned homes of the Palestinian refugees, made repatriation seem less likely.207  
 
Acheson denied financial aid to Israel, but later, in early 1953, President Truman decided that 
Acheson was to aid Israel with eighty million dollars to “help absorb into the productivity 
economy of Israel refugees already arrived and to permit a moderate rate of immigration.”208 
Acheson knew that Truman acted on aid to Israel because of his friendship with Israeli 
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officials and domestic pressure from presidential advisors, the so-called “Israel’s friends in 
the White House”.209 He also knew that it would underpin the Arab fear of Israeli 
expansionism and strengthen the conception that the US approved of this.210 Forgotten was 
the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, paragraph 6 of Article 49, which states: “The occupying 
power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it 
occupies.”211 Israel had signed that article in 1951.  
4.3 The Huleh conflict: an Israeli attempt to change status quo in the 
demilitarized zones by seizing Palestinian properties 
In early 1950, Israel pushed thousands of Bedouins out of the Negev. The Bedouins that had 
remained inside the borders of the new state of Israel were without identity cards. This gave 
the Israeli government the opportunity to justify their expulsion.212 The US did not object. 
Nor did it react when Israel destroyed two Christian towns in the upper Galilee the same 
year.213 The case of the villages of Bir Am and Iqrit was about two Catholic Christian 
communities that the Israeli army dispossessed in 1948, but the military authority promised 
the citizens that they later could return to their homes. The villages’ people complained to the 
High Court of Justice and won the case. They were not refugees, had not abandoned their land 
and were Israeli citizens. Still, the military authorities headed by the Minister of Police and 
Minorities, Bechor Shalom Shitrit, ordered expulsion and blew up the villages. The 
international press did not mention it.214  
 
However, the Huleh dispute in 1951-52 almost escalated into war between Israel and Syria, 
and this time the Americans got involved. Despite the fact that the Huleh situation involved 
Palestinian landowners and their properties in the demilitarized zone, the concern of the US 
                                                 
209Hahn, Caught in The Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab- Israel Conflict, 1945-1961, 134 
210 Ibid140 
211 Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/intro/195?OpenDocument access date: November 7, 2012 
212 Rebecca Manski, (2007): The Scene of Many Crimes: Suffocating Self-subsistence in the Negev http://rete-
eco.it/2011/documenti/35-riflessioni/146-bustan-article-news-from-within-qthe-scene-of-many-crimes-
suffocating-self-subsistence-in-t.html access date July 1, 2014  
213 Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945,152 
214 Joseph L. Ryan (1973): Refugees within Israel: The case of the villages of Kafr Bir ’Im and Iqrit, Journal of 
Palestine Studies, vol.2 no.4, 62 http://www.palestine-
studies.org/enakba/exodus/Ryan,%20Refugees%20within%20Israel.pdf access date: June 24,  2014 
  
51 
 
was about Syria and Israel, not about the Palestinian villagers.215 The reason for this was that 
Syria was in a particular situation compared to the other Arab states. Israel had defeated all 
the Arab states in the 1948 war except for Syria, who they did not manage to push over the 
northern border front.  
 
The armistice negotiations had been bilateral between Israel and the Arab states. Israel, with 
good diplomatic skills, were “insisting on basing the various negotiations on the borders 
[giving] them the best hand,” using the partition plan on some borders and the truce line on 
others.216 Syria on the other hand was not willing to negotiate on Israeli terms. The United 
States had a special interest in Syria’s armistice negotiation with Israel. In 1949, the Syrian 
government was unorganized and the new President Shukri al-Quwwatli was not very western 
or Israel friendly. The situation in Syria changed when a coup took place with help of the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The new government with the chief of staff of the Syrian 
army, Colonel Husni al-Zaim, as its leader was pro-western and anti-Soviet and was positive 
towards peace talks with Israel. This was just the way CIA wanted it.217 
 
The first attempt at armistice negotiations between Syria and Israel ended without results. 
Israel would not consider any less than Syria’s withdrawal to the old international borders, not 
considering the new truce line. On May 12, 1949, Bunche proposed to create a demilitarized 
zone under UN supervision, and on June 8, both Israel and Syria accepted a compromised 
agreement on the demarcation line. The question of sovereignty in the demilitarized zones 
was not clear in the agreement.218 Bunche’s attempt to make peace by creating the 
demilitarized zones, at least until more permanent solutions could be implemented, turned out 
to be a foundation for conflicts and armed clashes.219 Israel insisted that the demilitarized 
zone was Israeli territory and that they should restore normal civilian life. Israel did not want 
                                                 
215 The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations’ Washington May 17, 1951 - 7 
p.m. Restricted, FRUS 1951, vol. V 688-96, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1951v05&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=688 access date May 27, 2014 
216 Hilde Henriksen Waage og Petter Stenberg, “Cementing a State of Belligerency: The 1949 Armistice 
Negotiation between Israel and Syria”, Forthcoming Middle East Journal 2015,2  
217Ibid, 8   
218Ibid, 21 
219Ibid, 27  
52 
 
the UN to govern the zone. For Israel, it was important that Syria’s troops disappeared from 
the demilitarized zone. Ben-Gurion’s plan was to squeeze the Syrians out of the demilitarized 
zone and limit the influence of the UN so that the Israelis could establish settlements.220  
 
The Huleh dispute illustrated how the UN and the US State Department prioritized when it 
came to individual properties and peace negotiations. It started in October 1950 when Israel 
initiated a working program to drain all of the malaria marshes north of the Huleh Lake. At 
least this was the Israeli explanation for draining the marshes. The main purpose was Israeli 
takeover of the demilitarized zone.221 The draining to the south would cause the land of the 
Palestinian landowners in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria to be overflowed 
and was a violation of the armistices agreement. The Syrians protested on behalf of the 
Palestinian landowners to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, General 
William E. Riley. He meant that the project harmed the Palestinians, ruled in favor of the 
Syrians and demanded that Israel stop the project. Israel ignored the rulings and instead 
escalated the project by expelling eight hundred Palestinians from three villages in the 
demilitarized zone.222  
 
On April 4, 1951, Syrian soldiers opened fire on an Israeli patrol, killing seven Israelis. Israel 
answered by demolishing the three villages and bombed a Syrian army position nearby. The 
US State Department reacted and made Israel stop the aggression in fear of escalation to a 
full-scale war. Acheson recognized that if the US acquiesced to Israeli action, it would 
confirm the Arab charges of US acceptance of Israel’s expansionism. Therefore, the State 
Department drafted a resolution for the UN Security Council that condemned the Israeli 
attack and stated that Israel had to stop the draining project and let the villagers return to their 
homes. At the same time, the US encouraged Syria not to accelerate the crises but rather have 
a “helpful and constructive attitude.”223  
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In May, the fighting resumed. The US was concerned about the conflict and to what it might 
lead and called upon the Security Council to make a resolution to end the hostilities. The 
resolution stated that in spite of Syria’s provocation, it condemned Israel’s airstrike on April 
5, its disregard of the Mixed Armistice Commission’s rulings and its maltreatment of the 
Palestinians. The Israelis complained that the resolution would strain the Israel-US 
relationship and award Syria’s aggression. As so many times before, Israel’s government tried 
to get its will by turning to Truman. Using political advisers sympathizing with Israel in the 
White House and others who had an influence on the American President, among them 
Truman’s friend Weizmann, the Israeli officials tried to block the resolution. This time 
Truman did not bend, and the Security Council passed the resolution May 18.224 Truman told 
Acheson: “I [Truman] know nothing about the situation.” The President let the State 
Department handle the situation.225  
 
The Arab states gave the US credit for the support of the resolution. According to the US 
Minister to Damascus, Cavendish W. Cannon, “Arab League officials meeting in the Syrian 
capital were ‘surprised and hearted’ by tangible proof that [the] West [was] seeking justice in 
this instance.”226 Sharett realized that by further complains, Israel could jeopardize US aid 
and other advantages and found it better to accept the resolution and adjust Israel settlement 
policy to each case and its timing. The IDF and the Knesset criticized Sharett for capitulating. 
Sharett tried to balance both domestic and diplomatic interest and asked to continue the 
draining process on Israeli side. Syria opposed, but General Riley approved the draining on 
the Israeli side. The dispute continued for months, and this time the concern included the 800 
homeless Palestinians in the demilitarized zone. Acheson accused both parties for using the 
villagers as “pawns of national policy.”227  
4.4 Palestinians’ request for help from Americans to regain lost property 
There were Palestinians who fled the Israeli war of independence and tried to get the US 
government to help them retain their properties. Some of them had relatives in the United 
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States, others had applied for and been granted American visas and therefore felt a certain 
connection to the United States. They were often better off than the refugees that were stuck 
in the refugee camps in the Arab neighboring states. Many of them had just locked their doors 
and left their well-equipped properties with the certainty of being able to return. These 
properties were valuable and cherished by the new Jewish state. By turning to the US 
government, these refugees hoped to get help. Contrary to their hopes, the representatives of 
the US government just forwarded their requests to the Israeli Embassy or to the Jewish 
Agency in the US, who in turn responded in the negative with political sophistication and 
were thus to no help.228   
 
An example on US government inactivity at the expense of Palestinians requesting help to 
regain lost property was the letter from Assad S. Halaby to Senator Robert A. Taft on April 4, 
1953. Halaby asked for “assistance with respect to a claim witch [he] and [his] wife [had] 
against the Government of Israel for certain real estate and movable property.”229 Halaby was 
a Christian Palestinian to whom the US had granted non-quota immigration visas for him and 
his family in 1951.230 He continued his letter by complaining that there was no interest in his 
case from the United Nations, and having the status of “absentees” under Israel law, the 
Administrator of Absentee Property had confiscated their property. The Absentee Property 
Law of 1950 defined all persons that were away from their homes since November 21, 1947 
as absentees. Since Halaby and his family were seeking permanent citizenship in the USA and 
were not returning to Israel, he did not consider himself an absentee and claimed that the 
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Administrator should release his property. At the end of his letter, Halaby accused the United 
States, writing: 
We ask for your help as a matter of justice, because the support given to Israel by the 
United States made possible the seizure of our home. We have two sons of military age, 
both of whom will be required to enter the United States Army shortly, and as they will 
eventually receive the property we feel that there is at least a humanitarian basis for 
your intervention. Anything you can do for us will be deeply appreciated.231  
 
Taft forwarded the letter to the Israeli Embassy and got a reply from Minister Plenipotentiary 
David Goitein that even if Halaby now lived in the United States, this gave him no other 
rights than fellow countrymen who were poorer and did not have the same possibilities. The 
allegation from Halaby that the US made it possible for Israel to seize their home did not go 
without notice. Goitein wrote at the end of his answer to Taft: “The absurdity and 
baselessness of this statement must be well known to you (Taft). It would not therefore seem 
that Mr. Halaby’s case is one which calls for any special act on your part.”232  
 
The Jewish immigrants’ right to settle in Israel at the expense of the Palestinian refugees was 
by some US citizens justified. The property takeover by the new Jewish settlers did not seem 
to have much impact on the American public and their positive view of the newly created 
Israel. Not only did the American government ignore the injustice to the Palestinians and their 
loss of properties, so did part of the American public. A case in Acron, Ohio in 1952 gives an 
indication of this. Nathan Pinsky, who was Executive Director for the Acron Beacon Journal, 
wrote to Ambassador Abba Eban about an incident involving confiscation of a Palestinian 
property in Israel. According to Pinsky, the incident would be unfavorable for the Jewish 
people in the State of Israel and have “some serious repercussions for the Jewish community 
of Acron and the attitude of our non-Jewish community toward the State of Israel.”233 The 
whole matter was about a young man from Nazareth who went to study medicine in Beirut 
before 1947. After he had completed his medical training and degree, the Supreme Court of 
Israel on July 7, 1952 denied him return to Nazareth where the rest of his family still lived 
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and was relatively wealthy. The young Palestinian had other relatives in Acron, Ohio who 
were well known and respected in their community. The relatives wanted to publish the real 
reason for barring his return to Nazareth in the Acron Beacon Journal.  
The Government of Israel [was] desirous of confiscating the property of this family, 
which [had] a rather extensive holdings, and that they [did] not want this young man 
to return because they [did] not wish to either compensate or relinquish, or release the 
property to be seized from the family.234  
 
This was what was supposed to be the content of the article. The Acron Beacon Journal never 
published the story. Instead, Pinsky wrote to Eban saying that he was certain that the Israel 
government and the Supreme Court had their reasons for denying this man admission. He 
added that the newspaper was “quite anxious, from a public relations point of view, to do 
whatever [was] necessary to interpret the role that Israel plays on a positive basis as quickly 
as [they] possibly [could].”235  
 
The two stories above show how the Palestinians tried to address the government of the 
United States and made an effort to enlighten the American people about the Israelis’ seizure 
of their properties through the media. These Palestinians had the capacity and the capability to 
do so, as opposed to the ones that were stuck in the refugee camps in the Arab States. Most of 
the times their voices were not heard. The United States made one last attempt to create 
justice in the form of return of Palestinian assets when it in 1952 negotiated for the release of 
the blocked Palestinian bank accounts.    
4.5 The Blocked refugee’s bank accounts 
Despite the Palestinians seeming to have lost most of their properties, the US State 
Department made one final effort to create relief for them. On May 5, 1952, the American 
representative to the PCC, Ely Palmer, met with Eban to discuss the Palestinian refugees’ 
blocked bank accounts. Israel and Egypt had discussed this in February 1950 and even agreed 
upon a solution, but nothing came out of it. In 1952, Palmer and Eban managed to facilitate an 
agreement that could prove to be a significant initiative: To release the Palestinian funds. An 
                                                 
234Nathan Pinsky to Abba Eban, Washington D.C, July 31, 1952, ISA/RG 130/MFA/2491//5 
235 Ibid 
  
57 
 
estimated 20 000 to 30 000 of the Palestinian refugees had bank accounts in Israel that were 
blocked. Eban, on request from Palmer, asked the Israeli Government to consider releasing 
these funds, “As a manifestation of good-will on part of Israel.”236 Palmer told Eban that he 
was acting on behalf of the PCC, but that the US State Department had the same view. Eban 
wrote Sharett on May 8, stressing the importance to cooperate with the US since otherwise it 
could worsen the US-Israel relationship. In June, Israel told the US that it had revisited the 
issue of the blocked bank accounts and agreed to a gradual release.237 In return, Israel wanted 
the US to encourage the Arab States, especially Iraq, to release the blocked Jewish bank 
accounts. The PCC and Israel made an agreement in October 1952 that Israel would release 
about 20 percent of the refugees’ blocked bank accounts in December that year.  
 
The number of applicants who wanted their bank accounts released was much lower than 
expected. The reason was suspicion among the refugees, initiated by the Arab leaders, that 
there was a hidden agenda behind the release of funds. If the refuges accepted, it would 
legitimize Israel’s seizure of their money and be an implicit recognition of the State of Israel. 
Another issue was the allegation that Israel had imposed a 10 percent levy on the refugees’ 
bank accounts before the release, and that accounts over 500 pounds had been transferred to 
the Custodian of Alien Property and been confiscated. The PCC and Palmer urged the Arab 
refugees to claim the released funds as the first installment and stated that by doing so they 
would not prejudice the claims to their remaining balances.  
 
In a statement issued by the PCC on April 13, 1953, the committee admitted that the 
Government of Israel had officially informed them of the 10 percent charge, but only on 
accounts over 50 pounds. Israel had at the same time informed them that the “transfer of 
accounts over 500 pounds to the Custodian of Alien Property was for the technical purpose of 
facilitating the release of funds to account holders.”238  Israel’s answer to the accusation was 
“…that the release of these funds by the Government of Israel was only authorized as an act 
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of good-will and there is no desire to force them upon anyone.”239 Sharett continued by 
stating, “Once again the plight of the refugees is being made a pawn in the economic and 
political warfare being conducted by the Arab Government against Israel with callous 
disregard to the interests of the refugees themselves.”240 Still, the release of the bank accounts 
became a milestone achievement for the PCC and the US in terms of returning Palestine 
property.  
 
The bank account release was as close the PCC and the State Department came to returning 
Palestinian assets seized by Israel. The PCC did not succeed on repatriation or on returning 
Palestinian properties. Washington, acting in a way acceptable to Israel, had crippled the 
commission. By only considering compensation and resettlement as part of the solution, 
Washington prevented the PCC from using its own diplomacy whenever it contradicted that 
“red line”. Consequently, compensation became the only solution, and the Palestinian 
properties were lost to the people that once owned them.   
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5 Compensation and the making of Israel’s legal 
basis for property seizure 
In 1948, Israel had created the legal framework that would be of great importance for the 
abandoned Palestinian properties. The Absentee Property Law would legalize the Israeli 
government’s overtaking of the Palestinians’ land. The United States early established the so-
called “red lines” as part of its policy toward the Palestinian refugee problem. Not even the 
PCC would cross these policy boundaries. Stability in the region was important for the US 
because of the rivalry with the USSR concerning Middle Eastern allies. Resettlement of the 
Palestinian refugees in the neighboring Arab countries became the main goal for Israel and 
the US, and compensation for Palestinian lost properties was an instrument toward achieving 
this goal.241  
 
General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) called for compensation for the lost properties but did 
not answer the question of whom to compensate. Therefore, the UN and the PCC established 
different subcommittees to look after the refugees’ rights. These subcommittees would try to 
conduct their research independently of the Arab-Israel conflict.242  
5.1 The Transfer Committees 
When the Palestinian refugees fled their homes, the Jewish leaders could not believe their 
luck. “It was a miraculous simplification of Israel’s tasks,” Weizmann said.243 Abandoning 
their homes, the refugees made room for the Jewish settlers who could build the new Jewish 
State.  
 
How was the Jewish leadership to use this opportunity? Yosef Weitz was the director of the 
Jewish National Fund’s Lands Department, who already from the 1930’s had a vision of 
expelling all the Arab-Palestinians in favor of a genuine Jewish state in Palestine. In the 
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spring of 1948, Weitz together with two other officials from the Jewish National Fund, 
namely Eliyahu Sasson, who became director of the Middle East Affairs Department, and 
Ezra Danin, a leading citrus-grove owner and a senior Haganah intelligence officer, 
established a self-appointed Transfer Committee. The Committee sought to find out how to 
prevent the return of the refugees.244  
 
Weitz and his men wrote a memorandum with the title: Retroactive Transfer, a Scheme for 
the Solution of the Arab Question in the State of Israel.245 The memorandum described the 
actions necessary to prevent the refugees from returning to their homes, and it was shown to 
Ben-Gurion on June 5, 1948. It suggested the demolishment of abandoned villages, 
resettlement of abandoned sites and prevention of the refugees’ return. It also suggested 
enacting legislation “geared to barring a return.”246 Ben-Gurion officially never agreed to the 
existence of the committee but in silence, he approved. Weitz was frustrated even though he 
understood that Ben-Gurion could not be associated with the committee and its function. That 
would jeopardize the reputation of the new Jewish state and Ben-Gurion’s own standing in 
history.247  In August that same year, Weitz would head the Weitz-Danin-Lifshitz committee, 
this time an official Transfer Committee that would focus on resettlement for the refugees. 
The committee’s final report concluded that no refugees were to return and the preferable 
solution was resettlement.248  
5.2 The new legal framework for the abandoned properties 
In the turbulent time from 1947 to the beginning of 1948, there were no regulations for the 
abandoned properties that originally belonged to the refugees. Haganah’s Department of Arab 
Affairs together with Zionist agencies like the Histadrut’s Agricultural Center coordinated the 
usage of abandoned fields.  
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In June 1948, Israeli officials became concerned for the refugees’ properties. Pressure from 
the international community for compensation or repatriation called for some form of action. 
Therefore, the new government of Israel decided to consolidate the military and civilian 
committees dealing with abandoned refugee properties into one. The Haganah committees 
and the committee for Abandoned Arab Property became the Arab Properties Department 
within the new Ministry of Minority Affairs.249  
 
Already in July 1948, the Ministerial Committee for Abandoned Property, also called the 
Committee of Six, succeeded this Ministry. The committee included prominent politicians 
like Prime and Defense Minister Ben-Gurion and Foreign Minister Sharett, Finance Minister 
Elièzer Kaplan, Provisional Justice Minister Felix Rosenblueth (later Rozen), Provisional 
Minorities Affairs Minister Bekhor Shalom Shitrit, who later became Minister of Police, and 
finally Provisional Agricultural Minister Aharon Tsizling as the sixth member. The 
Committee’s first deed was to transfer the responsibility for handling the abandoned 
properties to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture. Inside the Ministry of 
Finance was the Office of the Custodian of Abandoned Property, which was the authority for 
all the abandoned properties.250  
 
On July 15, Kaplan appointed Dov Shafrir, who had headed a construction company of the 
Agricultural Center, as the first Custodian of Abandoned Property.251 The Office of the 
Custodian was similar to what the British had established during World War II when they set 
up a custodianship of enemy property as an emergency regulation. This was to prevent the 
Germans to take advantage of properties in Palestine. The question remained whether the 
Palestinian refugees could be considered an enemy.252 
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The Office of the Custodian was supposed to hold on to the Palestinian refugees’ properties 
until the Arab-Israel war was over. Meanwhile “the Custodian’s office technically controlled 
refugee land although it continued the policy of empowering the Ministry of Agriculture to 
lease the land to cultivators for up to 35 months. Profits were turned over to the Ministry of 
Finance.”253  
 
The establishment of committees and ministries was not sufficient legal grounds for 
expropriation of the properties. The legal framework for the Israeli government’s handling of 
the abandoned properties had to be considered carefully. The legislature therefore passed a 
series of laws that created the basis for the expropriation of refugee land. These laws were 
based on the British Mandate’s Defense (Emergency) Regulation from 1945. The riots 
between the Jews, Palestinians and the British at this time made the British implement certain 
drastic regulations in order to control the situation. Both the Palestinians and the Jews 
opposed these regulations.254  
 
In May 1948, when the British had left Palestine and Israel became a state, the provisional 
legislature of Israel declared a state of emergency and passed the Law and Administrative 
Ordinance, May 19, 1948. It states:  
a) If the Provisional Council of State deems it expedient so to do, it may declare that 
a state of emergency exists in the State, and upon such declaration being published in 
the Official Gazette, the Provisional Government may authorize the Prime Minister 
or any other Minister to make such emergency regulations as may seem to him 
expedient in the interests of the defense of the State, public security and the 
maintenance of supplies and essential services. 
b) An emergency regulation may alter any law, suspend its effect or modify it, and 
may also impose or increase taxes or other obligatory payments.255 
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On June 16, 1948, the Israeli government had decided that none of the refugees were to return 
for as long as the war lasted.256 On June 21, the Abandoned Property Law (Ordinance no. 12 
of 1948) was passed. Its purpose was to regulate the circumstances of the abandoned 
properties. Three days later, the Abandoned Areas Ordinance, June 24, 1948 expanded Israeli 
jurisdiction. It gave the Israelis the powers not only to preside over abandoned properties but 
whole areas as well as movable assets that were abandoned. The third law was the Emergency 
Regulations for the Cultivation of Fallow Land and the use of Unexploited Water Sources, 
October 11, 1948. It gave the Agricultural Ministry the right to cultivate so-called wasteland, 
meaning that land that had been abandoned because of the war should not stay uncultivated 
but instead be used and cultivated. The Custodian should hold on to the profit on behalf of the 
owner of the land, and the land could only be rented for two years and eleven months. This 
limitation was later expanded into five years in 1949.257 
5.3 Absentees’ Property Law 
The far most important of these new laws and a political breakthrough for the Committee of 
Six, but a disaster for the refugees, was the Emergency Regulations (Absentees’ Property) of 
December 2, 1948. The members of the committee had, on August 20, 1948 decided on a plan 
to expropriate refugee land. From this day on, the Israeli government abandoned the current 
property policy and moved from leasing the properties to a new direction: “Israel was to 
separate the refugees from legal title to their land and use it instead for permanent settlement 
of Jewish immigrants.”258  
 
The new Absentee Property Law shifted the legal concept from an abandoned land to that of 
the owner being declared an absentee. The focus was no longer on the land but on the people 
who owned it. The legal definition of an absentee was much more than that of just being a 
refugee.259 The law was defined so that the land was no longer abandoned, meaning only 
under temporary control by the Israeli government. Instead, being declared an absentee, you 
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had left behind your land and left it “under Israeli control indefinitely. The alienation of the 
refugees’ property out of their hands thus allowed for the long-term uses of the land they left 
behind in Israel.”260 
 
In a letter to UN Refugee Office member Holger Andersen, dated July 4, 1951, Dr. G. Meron, 
the Director of the Economy Division, answered Andersen on a question about “Arab 
Citizen”. “The term ‘Arab citizen’ [was] unknown to Israel law which does not distinguish 
between its residents on ethnic grounds.”261 Meron could easily proclaim this because the law 
did not separate on ethnic grounds it only excluded the absentees. An absentee was defined 
as: (1) a citizen of Arab state after November 29, 1947; (2) someone who had traveled to an 
Arab country after November 1947; (3) someone who was in any part of Palestine that was 
not under the control of Jewish forces after November 29, 1947; and (4) someone who for 
some reason was away from their regular home even if the place they went to or their home 
was inside areas under Jewish control.262  
 
Sharett had early recognized that if Israel should keep most of their conquered land, they had 
to word the law carefully. Therefore, the absentee property law included not only those who 
had left the country, but also those who stayed inside the borders.263 This law was enacted at 
the same time as the UN passed Resolution 194, December 11, 1948, which stated that those 
refugees who wanted to return should be allowed to do so, and those who did not return 
should be compensated. Neither UN resolution 194, the United States, who also opposed the 
Absentee Property law, or Truman, who at this was point fed up with Israel’s intransigence 
toward the refugees, could prevent the Israeli legislature from composing laws that allowed 
their government to take over the abandoned land.264 The US government admitted that these 
laws prejudiced the refugees’ rights and that the UN and the US were committed to safeguard 
the refugee’s properties, reflecting UN resolution 194.265 Before the Development Authority 
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was established, the US government believed the laws was on “custodial function although 
one regulatory provision [did] permit sale with proceeds blocked.”266  
  
The next step from the Israeli government was the establishment of the new Custodian of 
Absentee Property, which replaced the old Custodian of Abandoned Property. The new 
Custodian could lease the land for five years, but not sell it. Ben-Gurion wanted to sell the 
abandoned land to the Jewish National Fund on a permanent basis.267 This led to the 
enactment of the most important land law, the Absentee Property Law of 1950. It was passed 
on March 14, 1950 and stipulated the establishment of the Development Authority (Transfer 
of Property) Law 1950 on August 9, 1950. The de facto expropriation of absentees’ properties 
became legal by these two laws.268  
 
The Absentee Property Law of 1950 was an expansion of the 1948 law. The law was 
expanded so that it was possible to seize as much land as possible. The law stated that the 
Custodian could confiscate any land to a person that qualified as an absentee after November 
7, 1947. 269 This meant all absentees, not only Palestinian-Arabs, but also Arabs that owned 
land in Palestine and also non-Arabs. Meaning, non-Arab absentees with a foreign citizenship 
that was not in Palestine after November 7, 1947, lost their land. These landowners had an 
easier time when it came to receive compensation. Also Jews were declared absentees if they 
qualified. It was important that the law did not appear to discriminate in that it did not 
distinguish between Arabs or non-Arabs. This way the Israeli government justified their 
action to the international society. Still, Jewish absentees were treated differently in that they 
usually would get their land back as soon as they immigrated to Israel.270 The law also 
forbade any “attempts by the refugees to liquidate their property in exile”.271  
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On March 10, 1950, Ambassador James G. McDonald was instructed by the US government 
to discuss with Israeli officials the rumors of Israel selling refugee land. On April 19, the 
Embassy in Tel Aviv responded, stating that the Government of Israel could not be deterred in 
exercising the privilege that was granted the Israeli legislature, adding that there had “not 
been an instance where the Custodian [had] disposed of real property by sale.”272 According 
to the embassy, it was taking time to establish the State Development Authority. The Israeli 
government had not been able to make use of the new law. There were indications that the 
sales of absentee property would be limited.273 This argumentation was as close as the US 
came to protest the new laws. 
 
The Custodian of Absentee Properties’ main task was to administrate and maintain the 
absentee properties, while the Development Authority was mandated to measure the value of 
the properties and sell it to the government or to the Jewish National Fund.274 In 1953, the 
final law dealing with absentee properties was legislated, namely the Land Acquisition 
(Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law of 5713/1953. This law stated that Palestinians 
inside Israel that had lost their land were entitled to compensation, not the refugees outside 
Israel.  In combination, these laws made it possible for Israel to expropriate the Palestinians’ 
land.  
5.4 The political and economic question of compensation 
The State Department realized during the summer of 1949 and at the Lausanne conference 
that repatriation of all the Palestinian refugees was too complicated and that their focus had to 
be on resettlement and compensation. The Israelis insisted on discussing the property issue 
only in context of the whole Arab-Israel conflict. Israel had to consider restitution or 
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compensation, knowing that this would be linked to the question of repatriation or 
resettlement.275  
 
For the Israeli government, there was no question: resettlement was the only solution and 
thereby compensation. And “from the political point of view, the [US State] Department 
consider[ed] that failure to resolve the refugee problem would serve to perpetuate conditions 
of insecurity and unrest in the Near East.”276  Both the US State Department and the White 
House believed that stabilization in the Middle East was the main concern for the United 
States. The sooner the refugees were resettled, the better.  
 
Giving up on repatriation as a solution that would make peace between the Arab nations and 
Israel in the close future, US Near East policy bent the way Israel wanted. For the United 
States, this became a financial matter.277 Who was to pay for the resettlement and the 
compensation? In May 1949, the State Department had estimated the cost to be a total $267.5 
million over a three-year period for resettlement and repatriation. 278 This was when the 
negotiators at the Lausanne conference still hoped to repatriate 200 000 Palestinian refugees 
to their own homes.279 The exiting 520 000 refugees had to be resettled. For the Americans 
and the Israelis, Syria and Iraq seemed to be the countries that could absorb most of them and 
do so over such a short time as three years.280  
 
The cost would be on the United States, international banks, the Export-Import Bank and 
other states and organizations. The international banks did not favor lending to Middle 
Eastern nations without any direct revenues such as oil royalties. Syria had only transit fees 
from the Trans Arabian Pipeline, an income of less than $500 000 annually. The outcome was 
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that the United States would finance all costs remaining after the contributions from the 
others. Israel was expected to compensate $30 million.281  
 
Table 1.1 US State Department Estimates of Israeli Compensation and Cost to Repatriate 
and Resettle Palestinian Refugees, 1949282 
Expenses Cost ($US) 
Repatriation of 200,000 refugees 30,000,000 
Resettlement of 500,000 refugees 160,000,000 
Direct and indirect work relief for refugees 27,500,000 
Development projects in Arab world 50,000,000 
TOTAL 267,500,000 
 
To be Received From Minimum ($US) Maximum ($US) 
Israeli compensation 30,000,000 50,000,000 
International banks; Export-Import Bank 15,000,000 50,000,000 
Other States, organizations 25,000,000 50,000,000 
US (by reducing capital outlays) 150,000,000 117,500,000 
TOTAL 220,000,000 267,500,000 
  
5.5 The “Red Lines” 
Admitting that the cost of compensation mainly would be on the United States and the world 
community, and not on Israel, the US State Department had already at this point set a course 
for how the compensation policy should work, namely the “red lines”. The main goal was to 
stabilize the region as quickly as possible by resettlement. The State Department’s solution 
for the refugee problem was confirmed in a briefing book entitled “The Palestine Refugee 
Problem”. The briefing book stated two policy recommendations that were of importance for 
the US government. First, how far was the US willing to pressure Israel on repatriation for a 
certain number of refugees? Truman had spoken to Weizmann about the refugees, but still 
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there was no cooperation from Israeli side on this. Second, the US would ensure a refugee 
program and “if there [were] not adequate loans forthcoming from the international and the 
Exim Banks, we [US State Department] intended to request our share as a grant from 
congress.”283 In this briefing book, compensation was never mentioned directly but rather the 
cost of setting up a working program that would resettle the refugees.284 President Truman 
recognized the need for the financial contribution and was willing to commit to it.285  
5.6 The Clapp Mission 
In the summer of 1949, the PCC created a subcommittee that was to focus on the technical 
aspect of the refugee problem. The Technical Committee started its work on June 22, 1949 
and focused on Arab-Israel cooperation for a solution to the compensation question.286 
Nothing came out of the committee’s effort. The PCC had been set up to be a committee 
where the members were to act independently of their government’s policy, but the US 
dominated the committee, and with France and Turkey as US allies, Washington policy 
influenced the decisions made by the committee.287  
 
An important complementary body to the PCC was the United Nation Economics Survey 
Mission for the Middle East, also known as the Clapp Mission. It was established on August 
23, 1949. An American headed this body too, namely Gordon R. Clapp. He was Chairman for 
a Depression-era Governmental project and took time off to work for the PCC. The remaining 
members were the French diplomat Eirik Labonne, Sir Desmond Morton, also a diplomat, 
from the United Kingdom, and finally Turkey’s Minister of Public Works, M. Cemil Gökcen. 
 
The Clapp Mission was designated to investigate the refugees’ properties but went far beyond 
this in its research. It stuck to the US line and came up with a general regional development 
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plan that promoted resettlement of the Palestinians in the neighboring Arab countries.288 
Clapp himself, after traveling in the Middle East, became “aware of the deep emotional 
attachment the Arab world had to the Palestine refugees and the great hostility to any solution 
to their plight that appeared to compromise their rights to repatriation and/or 
compensation.”289 The UN Resolution 194 (III) on December 11, 1948 states:  
That the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours [sic] should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that 
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for 
loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in 
equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible. 290 
 
Even if the US were to seek resettlement instead of repatriation for the Palestinian refugees in 
order to create peace in the Middle East, Clapp warned his government that it could not 
disregard Resolution 194. Still, the Clapp commissions stuck to the plan and worked on how 
best to resettle the refugees. Clapp believed that when the refugees got the opportunities to 
work or get a livelihood, they would soon realize that their future was in the place they were 
located.291  
 
The first Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission to the PCC 
suggested a working program that would employ the refugees and create positive economic 
growth for the hosting countries.292 In the mission’s final report, which was released to the 
PCC on December 18, 1949, it concluded that the proposal made in the First Interim Report 
for a working program had been conducted and approved by the General Assembly by 
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Resolution 302 IV, December 8, 1949.293 Therefore, the United Nation Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) was established on December 8, 1949. 
Compensation was not mentioned in either of these reports.294  
 
The State Department, being satisfied with the outcome of the Clapp Mission’s work, put 
forward the question of who was going to pay for the working program. As they saw it, it 
would begin lobbying Congress for the funds. “The main tune of the lobbying [would] be that 
Clapp’s report [was] a substitute for an unconstructive expenditure for aid and relief to the 
refugees, and that by financing Clapp’s project no other money [would] be requested.”295 
Truman was positive to UNRWA and the effort to integrate the refugees into the local 
economy. “In a letter to Congress dated January 30, 1950 he recommended that the United 
States contributed $27.45 million which was one-half of the 54.9 million estimated by the 
General Assembly as necessary to operate the relief and work program for the estimated 
eighteen-month program.”296 The State Department and Truman agreed that the relief and 
work program did not solve the Arab-Israel disagreement on repatriation or resettlement but 
would help integrate the refugees into the local economy, and there would be need for no 
more international assistance for direct relief. “ It [would] pave the way for future 
resettlement for many of these people.”297 
 
Clapp, in addition to the final report, had privately suggested a plan that included 
compensation. The most ambitious measure in his private plan was that the PCC would 
appoint a “Refugee Property Trustee”. Both the Israelis and the US rejected this proposal. The 
PCC also ended up rejecting the idea by considering it too ambitious at the time. The question 
of a Refugee Property Trustee would later re-surface in the PCC’s efforts for Arab-Israel 
conciliation. Still, the PCC accepted Clapp’s suggestion to “make its own [PCC’s] ‘appraisal’ 
                                                 
293“Editorial notes” The Final report of the United Nation Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East FRUS, 
1949, vol. VI, 1549; Report from Sholom. Newman on Arab Refugee Camps, November11, 1953, ISA/RG 
130/MFA/360/18 note: box and folder nr. might not be correct 
294 Fischbach, Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 111  
295 E. Elath to M. Comay, December 9, 1949, ISA/RG 130/MFA/347/23 E  
296 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council 
(Lay), Washington February 27, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. V, 764 
297 Ibid, 764 
72 
 
of the value of the abandoned property.”298 The nature of the PCC would change after this in 
that it split into subcommittees that worked on the valuation of the refugees’ properties.  
5.7 The PCC Refugee Office  
In 1950, it became clear that the Israelis through the Custodian of Absentees’ Property had 
sold some of the refugees’ properties. The Arab delegation to the UN asked the General 
Assembly to create protection for these properties, and the General Assembly established the 
PCC Refugee Office by Resolution 394 (V) of December 14, 1950. The core of the Refugee 
Office consisted of Holger Anderson from Denmark, who became the director, Dr. Rene 
Servoise from France as the economic advisor, Tevfiq Erim from Turkey serving as the legal 
adviser and John. M Berncastle from Britain, who was the office’s land specialist. The first 
three were originally set out as a three-man team for the Committee of Technical Experts on 
Compensation, but the PCC transformed that committee into the Refugee Office.  
 
The Refugee Office was to make an estimate of the value of the refugees’ property. It started 
its work in Jerusalem on May 22, 1951, where Berncastle did the research for the estimate. 
“He based his figures on the ‘existing use value plus normal development value’ of the land at 
a given date, which he chose as 29 November 1947 [sic], the date of the UN General 
Assembly partition resolution.”299 Berncastle’s idea was to produce a global estimate of the 
value of the refugee’s property. He worked on the Village Statistics of the Mandatory 
Government from 1945, “which divided agricultural land into seventeen categories for 
taxation purposes, and specified with regard to each village whether the land was owned by 
Arabs, Jews or others.”300 His report on August 14, 1951 called “Valuation of Abandoned 
Arab Land in Israel” satisfied neither the Arabs nor the Israelis.301  
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The next year, Berncastle came up with a new compensation plan, which was similar to 
Clapp’s personal suggestion two years earlier, including a Refugee Property Trustee. 
Berncastle suggested that the UN established a financial group that would create a $50 million 
fund and that the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property would hand over the refugee’s land 
to the fund. Compensation would then be paid to the refugees from the fund, which raised the 
money by selling title to the land to the “Israeli government, the Jewish National Fund and 
Jews throughout the world, with Israel to make up any losses.”302 The Israelis rejected the 
plan and nothing further came of it.  
5.8 Israel’s counter-claim and compensation recipients 
Israel never refused to pay any compensation, but it wanted to link the whole compensation 
question up to the Arab-Israel peace agreement. This was contrary to the PCC, which thought 
that if there were to be any hope of obtaining results on conciliation, it would have to separate 
the two issues. Even though Israel refused Berncastle’s compensation plan, the Israeli 
government did not consider his estimate to be too far from its own on what was necessary to 
pay in compensation in order to avoid repatriation. Berncastle had estimated $280 million in 
1951 dollars; the Israelis had estimated $228.2 million in 1951 dollars.303  
 
There were certain criteria for Israel to negotiate for compensation. First, Israel had to have 
influence on the “amount of the Israel Government’s liability”304. The compensation for the 
Palestinian properties could not be based on market value because of the revolutionary 
changes that had occurred in Israel. “It would require an exhaustive analysis of the whole 
economic life of the State.”305 Compensation, according to Israel, had to be based on the value 
before November 1947 and seen in context of Israel’s counter-claims to the Arab 
Governments, “taking into consideration the fate of Jewish property in Iraq and so forth.”306 
The cost of settling Jewish immigrants also had to be taken into consideration. Then the 
method of payment was another question. The options discussed between Israeli officials and 
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the Refugee Office included an international loan and raising the money by German 
compensation for World War II.307  
5.9 The Lif Committee 
On October 20, 1949, the Israeli government created the Committee to Examine the Issue of 
Compensation for Absentee Property also called the Lif Committee. The head of the 
commission was Zalman Lifshits, who was a JNF man and had worked with Weitz. The 
committee focused mainly on compensation, and the research that was done not only sat the 
course for Israel’s compensation policy, but also sought to find out whether the “refugees still 
possess[ed] the rights of title to their sequestered land, and [whether] the UN resolution 
calling for compensation [was] legally binding for Israel?”308  
 
After four months, the committee’s report concluded that the Palestinian’s flight had been a 
military and political strategy of the Arab States. It also stated that the abandoned properties 
had been neglected by the state up until that point. Finally, the committee stated that the 
Absentee Property law from December 2, 1948 “did not pass legal title to the refugee’ land to 
the state.”309 The title to the land could only be transferred to the state if a final settlement for 
the refugees’ properties were achieved or if a new law, “specifically annulling the property 
rights of refugees [was] legislated.”310 The Absentee Property Law of 1950 became the 
solution.  
5.10 The US recognizes compensation as the solution 
From September to November 1951, the PCC arranged for a conference in Paris where the 
parties were to try to agree to a solution to the refugee problem. Instead of letting the Arab 
States or Israel’s delegation take the initiative to a negotiation, the PCC used Berncastle’s 
estimates for the losses of the refugees’ properties as a starting point. The committee put 
forward the Refugee Office’s Preliminary report on September 7. It dealt with the 
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compensation question and recommended creation of an authority to oversee the Israeli 
Custodian of Absentee Property and give permission prior to selling refugee land.311  
 
Additional solutions for compensation were brought to the negotiation table in Paris. The 
Paris conference was not so much a negotiation between Israel and the Arab States as it was 
between Israel and the US. For Israel, it was important not to admit any blame for the refugee 
situation in order to minimize the compensation cost. It was also important for Israel to make 
sure that they would not be responsible for individual compensations, but rather have the PCC 
create a fund that would be responsible for this. Israel could not afford to pay the total 
compensation that Berncastle had estimated, thus it was important that the US and the 
international banks realized that the compensation from Israel only could be derived from this 
estimate. In reality, Israel did not have the ability to pay, and the bulk of compensation would 
come from USA.312 
 
The conference in Paris did not solve the compensation problem. Still, Berncastle traveled for 
two years in the Middle East collecting facts about the refugees’ properties. Israel did not 
consider individual compensation at all. One reason for this was that Israel’s government was 
afraid that most of the compensation would go to the wealthy Palestinians, not to the masses. 
Israel wanted to integrate the masses into the neighboring Arab countries, helped by the 
compensation. 313 
 
Both Israel and the US State Department knew by this time that repatriation was out of the 
question. The dilemma for the Palestinians that had fled from their homes was that if they 
accepted the compensation, they would “nullif[y] their right to repatriation.”314 The US 
admitted that compensation would be instead of repatriation. The Israelis deemed that when 
the Custodian of Absentee Property took over the refugees’ properties, they no longer 
belonged to the Palestinians, but to Israel. The Palestinians argued that they owned the land 
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and that the Israelis at least should pay a “rent” for the income on the land. This would be a 
way of receiving compensation without admitting that they had given up their rights for their 
land. The US chose to recognize Israel as the legal owner of the land, but that Israel had to 
compensate the former Palestinian owners.315  
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6 Epilogue – the 1950ies 
During the early 1950ies, the US State Department tried to find a solution for the problem of 
compensation to the Palestinian refugees. Stabilization in the Middle East was important to 
the Americans. In May 1950, the United States, France and Great Britain made a non-
aggression agreement related to the arms trade to the Middle Eastern nations. They signed the 
Tripartite Declaration on May 25. This agreement intended to stabilize the relationship 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors by “condition arms sales to Middle Eastern states on 
their willingness to pledge non-aggression.”316 By that, the nations would only be allowed to 
maintain, “a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security 
and their legitimate self[-]defense.”317   
 
The agreement undermined the PCC and its efforts to establish a permanent peace settlement. 
In addition, it was a de facto recognition of the post-war armistice borders that favored Israel.  
Despite this, the US did not try to make a more lasting peace between the belligerents, and 
Israel was in no hurry as long as she benefited from the agreement.318  
 
At the same time as the Tripartite Declaration was signed, President Truman entered into 
another war. In June 1950, the Korean War broke out, and the US had to shift its foreign 
policy priority. The Korean conflict reflected the geopolitics of the Cold War, and the United 
States stood against communism, with the USSR and China as its enemies. The United States’ 
foreign policy was challenged by the crisis that overshadowed the conflict in the Middle East. 
For the United States, the Cold War made it important to keep its allies and preferably gain 
new ones. Israel had always had a Western attitude, but knowing that a great number of 
Eastern European Jews had immigrated to Israel, Truman had asked Ben-Gurion whether 
Israel was about to become a “red state”.319 
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Israel was quick to recognize United States’ desire for allies and used the opportunity to 
improve its relationship with the US. Israel supported the UN intervention in the Korea War 
and “[identified] with the Western powers, to the extent of entertaining the dispatch of Israeli 
troops to help the UN forces in Korea.”320  This paid off. The US adopted a new stance and 
became more conciliatory toward Israel. Still, compensation for the overtaking of abandoned 
refugee land was an issue, and the US meant that Israel had economic and political 
obligations to pay compensation.321  
 
In February 1953, the first transfer of refugee land from the Custodian of Absentee Property, 
to the Development Authority had taken place. The Custodian of Absentee Properties’ main 
task was to administrate and maintain the absentee properties, while the Development 
Authority was mandated to measure the value of the properties and sell it to the government 
or to the Jewish National Fund. The Arab states lodged an official complaint to the UN. The 
United States had to renew their thinking about the Palestinian refugees’ properties and 
compensation.322 The final and best idea the State Department came up with was to create an 
international financial corporation for compensation and resettlement. The corporation would 
pledge Israel “to pay the corporation in annual installments.”323 It was hard to say if Israel 
would be able to pay back the money it owed to the corporation, but according to US 
diplomats “such losses to the United States would nonetheless be acceptable because of the 
overall solution would lead to the solution of the refugee problem.”324   
 
Nothing came out of the State Department’s proposal, but an idea had taken place, if not in 
the Israeli or American minds, so in the Arab minds. The Arab states rekindled Clapp’s idea 
from four years earlier with the aim to establish a UN property custodian that would 
safeguard the refugees’ properties. This way the refugees would not lose title to their land and 
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the UN would safe keep the income from their abandoned properties. The effort by the Arab 
States did not lead to any UN resolution, but the idea would for many Palestinians become a 
principle in the years to come; property restitution, not property compensation.325 
 
During the 1950s, there was a change of Presidency in the US, and for the Americans, the 
Cold War was getting colder and access to Arab oil supply continued to have top priority. US 
Middle East policy did not include the refugees. Republican President Dwight Eisenhower 
succeeded President Truman in 1953 and had other perceptions than the previous president. 
“The Palestinians never figured in Eisenhower’s strategic calculations – or most likely, in his 
consciousness at all.”326 On the Arab-Israeli conflict, President Eisenhower thought it was 
important to be “friendly with both sides”.327  
 
Israel had accepted their liability for compensation to the refugees, but only by certain 
criteria. At a meeting that took place in Tel Aviv on May 13, 1953 between Secretary of State 
John F. Dulles and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, Sharett stated that Israel came to possess 
the refugees’ land as a result of the Arab-Israel war, and that Israel had not been the 
aggressive part. Sharett also opposed individual claims from the refugees. Israel would rather 
prefer a “lump sum payment into [an] international fund to be used in connection [with an] 
overall plan for refugee settlement ‘rather than frittered away piecemeal’.”328 Both the US and 
Israel agreed on this design, the main purpose was to resettle the masses of the refugees.329 
 
The new US administration saw Israel as an impediment to suppressing Soviet influence and 
to access to cheap oil from the Arab nations. Therefore, Eisenhower excluded Israel from the 
Western-led regional defense alignments and gave the Israelis no American weapons. The US 
also “repeatedly rebuffed [Israel] pleas for security guarantees; pressured her to reach an 
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accommodation with Egypt at the price of surrendering her southern part of the Negev…[and] 
forcing Israel to withdraw from Sinai following the 1956 Suez War.”330  For the Palestinian 
refugees, President Eisenhower’s not so friendly attitude toward Israel did not help them. 
Their situation had been unchanged since the 1948 war. Instead of repatriation and 
compensation, the refugees became shattered all over the Middle East. In the eyes of the US 
government, the Palestinians were a “disruptive mass of refugees.”331 The US kept ignoring 
the true dimension of the Arab-Israel conflict, namely that it arose from Jewish immigrants 
dispossessing a local majority population.  
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7 Conclusion 
US policy deterred from its original objective to safeguard the Palestinian refugees’ right to 
return or receive compensation for their lost properties. For the US government it was 
important to establish stability in the Middle East, and the US ended up recognizing Israel as 
the owner of the abandoned Palestinian land. It had failed to implement a policy that made 
Israel repatriate the refugees and give back their properties. The US retracted when Israel 
refused to yield on its non-return policy. The Palestinian property issue was left to the UN, 
and the United States instead financed the UN aid programs for the refugees.  
 
Throughout his presidency, Truman conceded to Israeli demands. The White House’s 
overruling of the State Department had negative consequences for the Palestinian refugees 
and their goal to return to their homes. The PCC, too, failed to solve the underlying problem: 
repatriation for the refugees or resettlement and compensation for the land that the Israelis 
overtook. The PCC did not fail by lack of trying but because of the absence of US pressure on 
Israel.  
 
When President Harry S. Truman supported a Jewish state in Palestine, the US became deeply 
involved in establishing a “new country in a foreign land with an indigenous majority 
population”332. After the United States had approved the Partition Plan in 1947, President 
Truman had to reverse his policy on partition. In January 1948, the State Department, realized 
that the partition policy in Palestine could not be implemented without violence. The plan was 
to convince the UN Security Council to bring the Palestine conflict back to the UN. But the 
damage was already done. US had supported the Partition Plan and indirectly enabling to the 
unforeseen arising refugee problem and the Jewish seizure of Palestinian properties.  
 
It was important for Truman not to be seen as a faltering President. He therefore emphasized 
that the adoption of a trusteeship was not the same as abandoning his stand on the partition. 
As soon as the bloodshed in Palestine was over, the partition could be established. On the 
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other hand, Truman had promised his old friend Chaim Weizmann, who was to become 
Israel’s first president, that there would be no change in US policy toward Palestine. The 
whole matter became an embarrassment for the President, who blamed the State Department 
for “pulling the rug from under his feet.”333 Truman reversed his stand on partition, not so 
much because of pressure from the State Department, nor because he had changed his mind 
on the Jews’ right to a home in Palestine, but because he truly tried to do what was best for 
the United States. The State Department would later experience that Truman was not an easy 
man to convince. The President made bold decisions and was inexperienced on foreign 
policy, and that did not always turn out in the best interest of the United States.  
 
Up until late 1949, Truman and the State Department pulled in different directions when it 
came to solving the question of Palestinians right to return to their homes. That is to say, 
Truman, to the benefit of Israel, retracted from politics that in any manner required Israel to 
take steps that would contribute to a successful conclusion of the problem. 
 
US domestic policy had a direct impact on the Jewish expropriation of the Palestinian 
properties. In 1948, Truman ran for office and needed the votes from the Jewish community 
in America. For the President, the Israel lobby became important for his domestic policy and 
his presidential election. “American politicians and policymakers may occasionally need to 
bow before the false gods of domestic politics and a virtuous foreign policy”.334 This was also 
the case for Truman. He needed the Jewish votes in New York to win the 1948 presidential 
election. And by promising the Zionists his support for the Jewish state, Truman would 
receive support from the Jewish society and other Americans who supported the creation of a 
Jewish state in Palestine.  
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The recognition of Israel caused frustration in the State Department, which blamed Truman 
for basing his decisions on domestic rather than international considerations. Despite this 
probably being the case, there are indications that Truman truly believed the Jews should have 
their own state and did what his conscience told him, not having only poll results or ratings on 
his mind. The outcome was the Arab-Israel war, and hundreds of thousand Palestinian fled 
from their homes, leaving their properties to be resettled by Jewish immigrants.   
 
In mid-1948, the State Department urged Truman to act on the Palestinian refugee problem, 
which had become a humanitarian problem. To help the refugees, the UN established a thirty-
two-million dollar refugee-relief program, and the US Congress was convinced to raise half of 
the money. This was to become a key issue for the Americans. The US was to contribute 
more funds to the Palestinians than any other nation in the UN. It seems as if the US was 
buying time in order to find out how to handle the problem of repatriation for the Palestinians 
and come to a final peace settlement. At this point, the Arab states only considered 
repatriation as the solution for the Palestinians. The US State Department wanted repatriation 
as soon as possible for US national security reasons. The crisis could cause Soviet 
interference, which was undesirable. The individual Palestinian properties were at this time 
not even in the political discussion. The American government and the United Nations 
considered the Arab-Israel war to be the basic problem to solve, and then the refugees could 
return to their properties. In the meantime, the US would aid the refugees.  
 
The Americans were getting tired of Israel’s intransigence on the refugee issue. In August, 
James McDonald, the first US ambassador to Israel, told Ben-Gurion, the new Prime and 
Defense Minister of Israel, that if Israel did not reconsider and take back a substantial number 
of Palestinian refugees, the US would consider sanctions against Israel. At the end of 1948, 
Truman, too, embraced the solution that Israel had to repatriate the refugees and give back 
their properties. Stability in the Middle East region was what the American wanted. The State 
Department worried about losing access to Arab oil resources and that the refugees would 
become a tool for communism, thus posing a threat to the pro-Western Arab nations.  
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The US warning to Israel did not stop the Israeli expansionism after the 1948 war. The Jewish 
settlers harvested the Palestinian refugees’ crops, and the US criticized this but failed to 
recognize that Israel’s political motive was to acquire the properties. Thus, the Israelis used 
un-harvested crops as a plausible reason for taking over Palestinian land. When the US did 
not sanction Israel and instead aided the refugees, the Israelis were free to use the refugees’ 
properties to settle new Jewish immigrants.  
 
The United Nations established the Palestine Conciliation Committee  (PCC) on December 
11, 1948 with Mark F. Ethridge from USA as its leader.  In an effort to conciliate the Arab 
states and Israel, the PCC arranged a peace conference in Lausanne, Switzerland from April 
to September 1949. The committee had the backing from the US, and in the beginning, 
Ethridge kept a close connection to the Truman government, even if the UN committee 
members were not supposed to be influenced by their own nations. This practice would 
continue, and the US would put pre-selected Americans in key positions in the UN 
committees that handled the Palestinian question.  
 
Shortly before the Lausanne conference in April, Ethridge told Truman that the Israelis had 
no intention of letting the refugees return to their homes. Truman, who at this point was 
disgusted with how the Jews treated the Palestinian refugees, approached Ben-Gurion but to 
no use. The Israelis answer was that “they intended to bring about a change in the position of 
the United States Government… through means available to them in the United States.”335 
The State Department responded by suggesting that the US withheld $49 million from a $100 
million Export-Import Bank loan to Israel unless Israel took back at least 200 000 refugees. 
After the State Department’s threat to Israel, it received a message from the White House to 
the effect that the President “wished to dissociate himself from any withholding of the Ex-Im 
bank loan.”336 The Zionists had once more made president Truman change his mind.  
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Israel applied for membership in the UN, was not admitted the first time, but applied again in 
February 1949. Ethridge and the State Department believed that it was possible to hold the 
UN membership-ticket hostage to make Israel reconsider its refugee policy. President 
Weizmann interfered and wrote a letter to Truman about the UN membership question. Israel 
did not accept to the internationalization of Jerusalem, but by yielding on the Jerusalem issue, 
President Truman was satisfied. The Jerusalem problem gave priority to the matter of the 
Palestinian refugees returning to their properties. On May 11, 1949, Israel became a member 
of the United Nations without yielding on its rejection to repatriate the Palestinians. 
 
Truman’s inconsistency frustrated the Americans at the UN. They had a hard time explaining 
their own government’s decisions. Ethridge was fed up with Truman sabotaging the PCC. He 
meant that if US was not ready to sanctions Israel for not obeying the directions to the UN, 
“they might as well throw the United Nation out of the window.”337  
 
The Lausanne conference went nowhere, and the Israelis understood that they had to present 
some proposal for repatriation to placate the United States. Truman himself had told the 
Jewish leaders what he thought of Israel’s uncompromising attitude. Instead of announcing 
officially that Israel was willing to repatriate 100 000 Palestinian refugees, President Truman 
was early and surreptitiously asked about the proposal, and he found it a good start for 
negotiation between the belligerents. The offer to repatriate 100 000 refugees was not as well 
received among the other participants in Lausanne. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was tired 
of the “take it or leave it attitude” from Israel, and the Arab states rejected the proposal.338 By 
trying to overturn the decision by turning Truman against the State Department, the Israeli 
government made matters worse for itself. Truman became so furious that he suspended the 
$49 million balance of Israel’s $100 million Export-Import Bank loan. By acting together, the 
White House and the State Department were able to counteract the Israeli position.  
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After the failure of the Lausanne conference, US policy had moved from repatriation to 
resettlement because of the failure to conduct a policy that would force the Israelis to 
repatriate the refugees and return their properties. The US government conceded that 
resettlement for the refugees was going to be the solution, and instead of repatriation, there 
had to be compensation. After this, the US made sure that the PCC focused on technical 
issues relating to compensation. “From the political point of view, the [US State] Department 
consider[ed] that failure to resolve the refugee problem would serve to perpetuate conditions 
of insecurity and unrest in the Near East.”339. The sooner the refugees were resettled, the 
better.  
 
Washington established the “red lines”, which were undeclared parameters intended to guide 
the PCC in the way Washington found fit. The “most important of these were that repatriation 
was not feasible and that refugee compensation must be in lieu of repatriation.”340  
 
The State Department’s solution to the refugee problem was confirmed in a briefing book 
entitled “The Palestine Refugee Problem” where two main issues were presented. First, how 
far was the US willing to pressure Israel for repatriation on a certain number of refugees? 
Second, the US would ensure a refugee program and “if there [were] not adequate loans 
forthcoming from the international and the Exim Banks, we [the US State Department] 
intended to request our share as a grant from congress.”341 President Truman recognized the 
need for the financial contribution and was willing to commit to it. This shows that the State 
Department also had given up on repatriation and endorsed the White House policy on the 
Palestine property question. The State Department’s concern was foremost that policy was 
made in the best interest of the United States and that the US policymakers did not yield from 
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their stance. The displaced Palestinians had become an obstacle to the stability in the region, 
and it was important to settle the problem without “rocking the boat” too much. 
 
Even if the refugee problem was closely interconnected with the Arab-Israel conflict, the 
Palestinians were mainly tools for the belligerents. They were introduced to several 
compensation plans without even wanting to be compensated but rather repatriated. By 
moving away from repatriation as an alternative, the UN aligned its refugee policy to that of 
the US, which was primarily that of resettlement and compensation to the refugees.   
 
In August 1949, the US and the UN started working on resettling the dispossessed 
Palestinians. The PCC established the Economic Survey Mission mandated to “examine the 
economic situation in the countries affected by the recent hostilities, and to make 
recommendations to the Commission for an integrated program.”342 The so-called “Clapp 
commission”, headed by the American Gordon R. Clapp, worked on how best to resettle the 
refugees. But Clapp warned the US State Department that if the US were to seek resettlement 
instead of repatriation for the Palestinian refugees in order to create peace in the Middle East, 
it could not disregard UN Resolution 194 (III) from December 11, 1948. The resolution states 
that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors 
should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be 
paid for the property of those choosing not to return. 
 
The Clapp Report suggested a working program that would employ the refugees and create a 
positive economic growth for the hosting countries. The UN General Assembly approved the 
proposal on December 8, 1949 and established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). The State Department and Truman agreed that the relief 
and work program did not solve the Arab-Israel disagreement on repatriation or resettlement 
and compensation but would help integrate the refugees into the local economy, and there 
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would be no need for more international assistance in the form of direct relief. “ It [would] 
pave the way for future resettlement for many of these people.”343  
 
From September to November 1951, the PCC arranged for a conference in Paris where the 
Arab states and Israel were to try to agree to a solution to the refugee problem. The Paris 
conference was not so much a negotiation between Israel and the Arab States as it was 
between Israel and the US. The Americans and the international banks realized that Israel did 
not have the ability to pay compensation for the Palestinians lost properties and the bulk of it 
would come from the USA. 
 
The US government was concerned that failure to resolve the refugee problem would create 
instability in the region, but also recognized that Israel was unable to pay the amount 
estimated for compensation. Therefore, it would be cheaper for the United States to contribute 
large amounts of money for the purpose of resettlement and compensation rather than allow 
the refugee problem to fester.  
 
The US conceded that compensation would be the solution in favor of repatriation. The 
Israelis argued that when the Custodian of Absentee Property, which was the result of the 
enactment of the most important Israeli land law, the Absentee Property Law of 1950, took 
over the refugees’ properties, they no longer belonged to the Palestinians but to Israel. Both 
the UN and the Americans had objected to this law, but did not follow up. The Palestinians 
argued that they owned the land and that the Israelis at least should pay a “rent” for the 
income on the land.344 This would be a way of receiving compensation without admitting that 
they had given up their rights to their land. 
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The US recognized that Israel had become the legal owner of the land, but had to pay 
compensation in lieu of repatriation. Since Israel did not have the funds, the cost of 
compensation fell on the United States. American affirmed its acceptance of Israel’s 
displacement of the Palestinians by its willingness to compensate the Palestinians for land that 
the Israelis had taken over. The majority of the refugees never accepted the compensation 
solution. Ultimately, the US left the Palestinians to the UNRWA and instead became the 
biggest contributor to this refugee relief program. 
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Appendix A – Directory of People 
Abdul, Rahman, Secretary General of the Arab League 
Acheson, Dean, succeeded George Marshall as US Secretary of State in 1949 
Alexander the Great 
Anderson, Holger, Danish director of the Refugee Office  
Austin, Warren, American UN Ambassador  
Balfour, Arthur James, Balfour Declaration 
Ben-Gurion, David, Israel’s first Prime and Defense Minister 
Bernadotte, Folke, UN mediator 
Berncastle, John. M, British land specialist of the Refugee Office  
de Boisanger Claude, French PCC member  
Blackstone, William Eugene, American evangelist, 1878 
Brandeis, Louis Dembitz, Zionist a leader for the American Provisional Executive Committee 
for General Zionist Affairs in 1914 
Bunche Ralph, UN mediator 
Cannon, Cavendish W., US Minister to Damascus 
Clapp, Gordon R., leader United Nation Economics Survey Mission for the Middle East 
(Clapp Mission) 
Clifford, Clark, Truman’s White House adviser 
Cresson, Warder, the first full-time consul in Jerusalem, appointed in 1844 
Danin, Ezra, senior Haganah intelligence officer, established a self-appointed Transfer 
Committee 
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Dulles John F., Secretary of State in 1953 
Eban Abba, Israeli Ambassador in Washington 
Eisenhower, Dwight, US President succeeded Truman  
Elath, Eliahu, Israeli ambassador to the US 
Erim, Tevfiq, Turkish legal adviser of the Refugee Office   
Ethridge, Mark F., first leader of PCC 
Goitein, David, Minister Plenipotentiary of Israeli Embassy in USA 
Gordius, King of Phrygia who tied an intricate knot 
Griffis, Stanton, Foreign Service officer appointed by the State Department to lead the thirty-
two-million aid fund to the Palestinian refugees in 1948 
Gökcen, M. Cemil, Turkey’s Minister of Public Works 
Halaby, Assad S., Palestine man in USA 
Harrison, Benjamin, US President (1889 -1993) 
Henderson, Loy W., American charge ‘affairs to Damascus 
Herzl, Theodor, the founder of political Zionism, 1896 
Johnson, Louis A., US Secretary of Defense  
Kaplan, Elièzer, Israeli Minister of Finance  
Kennan, George F., State Department’s Director of Policy Planning 
Lansing, Robert, Secretary of US State Department under President Wilson 
Labonne, Eirik, French diplomat  
Lie, Trygve, Norwegian UN Secretary General 
Lifshits, Zalman head of the Lif Committee 
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Lovlett, Robert, Under-Secretary of State 
Mack, Julian, Mack Zionist 
MacArthur, Douglas, US General - commander of American forces in Asia  
McDonald, James, first US ambassador to Israel 
McDonald John, Presbyterian Pastor of Albany, NY, 1814 
McGhee, George C. US coordinator on Palestine 
Marshall, George, Secretary of State 
Meron, Gershon, the Director of the Economy Division Israeli Foreign Ministry 
Merrill, Selah, first serious and influential consul of the 19th century in Jerusalem 
Morton, Sir Desmond, a diplomat from the United Kingdom 
Palmer, Ely, the American representative to the PCC, 1952 
Pepper, Claude, US Senator 
Pinsky,Nathan, Executive Director for the Acron Beacon Journal 
Porter, Paul A. succeeded Ethridge (PCC) 
al-Quwwatli, Shukri, Syrian President  
Riley, William E., general and Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., US President (1933-1945) 
Rosenblueth, Felix, (later Rozen) Provisional Justice Minister  
Sasson, Eliyahu, official from the Jewish National Fund, who became director of the Middle 
East Affairs Department 
Saud, Ibn King of Saudi Arabia 
Serot , Andre, French officer sitting next to Bernadotte when he was shot 
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Servoise, Dr. Rene, French economic advisor of the Refugee Office 
Shafrir, Dov, Custodian of Abandoned Property 
Shamir, Yitzhak, one of three leaders from the terrorist group Stern Gang, later in 1983 Prime 
Minister 
Shertok, Moshe, (later change name to Sharett) Israel’s Foreign Minister  
Shitrit, Bekhor Shalom, Minister Provisional Minorities Affairs Minister, later Minister of 
Police 
Shuqayri, Ahmad, “Palestinian advisor” at Lausanne peace conference 
Silver, Abba Hillel, Rabbi and Zionists formed in 1943, the American Zionist Emergency 
Council 
Taft, Robert A., US Senator 
Truman, Harry S., US President (1945-1953) 
Truman, Mary Jane, President Truman’s sister 
Tsizling, Aharon, Provisional Agricultural Minister 
Wallace, Henry A., Vice-President from 1941-1945 and Secretary of Commerce from 1945-
1946 
Wasson, Thomas C., US General Consul in Jerusalem 
Weitz, Yosef, Director of the Jewish National Fund’s Lands Department 
Weizmann, Chaim, Israel’s first President 
Wilson, Woodrow, US President (1913-1921) 
Wise, Stephen, Zionist 
Yalcin, Hussein C., Turkish PCC member 
al-Zaim, Husni Colonel, chief of staff of the Syrian army 
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Appendix B - Abbreviations 
AJC – American Jewish Committee  
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency.  
ESM – Economic Survey Mission 
IDF – Israel Defense Forces 
JNF – Jewish National Fund 
Lehi – Lohamei Herut Israel (Stern Gang) 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PCC- Palestine Conciliation Commission 
UN – United Nation 
UNSCOP – United Nation Special Committee on Palestine 
UNRWA – United Nation Relief and Works Agency 
US – United States 
USA –United States of America 
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
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Appendix C – Map of the Partition 
 
Adapted from the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 
(PASSIA): http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/MAPS/1947-un-partition-plan-reso.html 
(October 18, 2014) 
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Appendix D – Laws and UN Resolutions 
Haag Convention 
Haag Conventions IV, 1907 ”Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land”. Article 49 
of the Geneva Convention, 1949 “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as 
deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the 
occupying power or to that of any other country occupied or not, are prohibited, 
regardless of their motives. https://www.icrc.org/ihl/intro/195?OpenDocument (Access 
date: November 7, 2012) 
Israeli Laws 
Law and Administrative Ordinance, May 19, 1948. 
http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/lawandadministrationord.htm 
(September 3, 2014)  
Absentee Property Law, March 14, 1950. 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/E0B719E95E3B494885256F9A005AB90A 
(August 20, 2014)  
Transfer of Property Law, August 9, 1950. 
http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/devauthoritylaw.htm 
(October 21, 2014) 
UN Resolutions 
United Nation General Assembly Resolution 181, November 29, 1947. Partition Plan A/364, 
3 September 1947, Official records of the second session of the General Assembly, 
Supplement No. 11, United Nation Special Committee On Palestine, report to the 
General Assembly, 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/07175de9fa
2de563852568d3006e10f3?OpenDocument, (July 15, 2014) 
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The UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) on December 11, 1948. http://daccess-
ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/65/IMG/NR004365.pdf?OpenElemen
t (September 1, 2014) 
UN General Assembly Resolution 273 (III) 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/83E8C29DB812A4E9852560E50067A5AC  
(November 24, 2013) 
UN General Assembly Resolution 349 (V) on December 14, 1950. Progress Report of the 
United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine; Repatriation or resettlement of 
Palestine refugees and payment of compensation due to them. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/059/92/IMG/NR005992.pdf?OpenElement 
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